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THE PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANNE BOWEN POULIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE development of the law involves constant tension between
abstract principles and practical applications. Nowhere is this
more true than in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. While defining Fourth Amendment protection, the United States Supreme
Court has lamented the difficulty of attaining governmental conformity with the constitutional restrictions imposed. Because of this
limited congruence between abstract and actual Fourth Amendment protection, even reasonable and principled interpretations of
the Constitution may effectively reduce the protection of Fourth
Amendment interests. Any new rule permitting the government to
justify intrusions under the Fourth Amendment threatens to erode
fundamental individual protections when the government exploits
any perceived latitude in the rule and the courts must respond to a
new set of arguments and new testimonial claims.'
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,2 the Court held that tactile exploration of an object could provide the basis to conclude it is seizable,
3
recognizing the "plain feel" corollary to the plain view doctrine.
One method for determining whether the Dickerson decision has ef* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I would like to thank

my research assistants William Cooper, Anthony Yacullo, Christopher Mowery and
Stephen Zamborsky for their diligent work in the preparation of this manuscript. I
am also grateful to Villanova Law School for generously supporting my efforts.
1. SeeTranscript of Petitioner's Oral Argument at 10, Maryland v. Wilson, 117
S. Ct. 882 (1997) (No. 95-1268) ("[Ilt's privacy and dignity, and we all know that
the police will take our decisions as far as their language and logic will permit
.... "). During this oral argument, Justice Kennedy expressed his concern that no
matter which way the Court decided, the police would push their holding as far as
they possibly could. See id.
2. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
3. Id. at 378.
(741)
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fected an erosion of protection is to examine the results of its application in state and federal courts. By assessing the action of the
rule as applied, we learn whether principled lines are firmly drawn
or whether lines drawn on sound principles acquire flexibility when
shaped by specific factual situations. In addition, however, we must
realize that police actions reflected in written judicial decisions reflect only a minute segment of actual police behavior. Thus, even
though we rarely find a decision in which the police search uncovered no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, we must assume that
some searches similar to those reported are carried out without
yielding evidence and, consequently, without generating judicial
proceedings and decisions. Whether the "plain feel" exception
under Dickerson encourages more invasive but unfruitful searches is
an elusive and troublesome question. Although Dickerson itself represented no remarkable erosion of Fourth Amendment protection,
sloppy reasoning and overly deferential fact finding typify its application and threaten Fourth Amendment rights.
II.

BACKGROUND

When the Supreme Court decided Terry v. Ohio,4 some commentators feared that the Court had unleashed police discretion. 5
Although Terry articulates careful limitations on stop and frisk, demanding reasonable suspicion for both the stop and the frisk, some
scholars feared that the limitations would break down, the standards would not be enforced and that law enforcement would exploit the exceptions to the detriment of privacy interests. 6 Today,
almost thirty years later, some believe that those fears have been
7
realized.
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. See Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 183186 (1968) (contending that it may be difficult to limit scope of Terry search);
Donetta Wypiski, Note, Criminal Law-Searches and Seizures, 7 DUQ. L. REv. 144,
150-151 (1968) (fearing that minorities will be subject to police harassment as result of reasonable suspicion standard); cf. Mitchel D. Platt, The Limits of Stop and
Frisk-QuestionsUnanswered by Terry, 10 Aiuz. L. REV. 419, 435-37 (1968) (discussing
risks, but concluding that adequate protections are available). See generally Wayne
R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 122-26 (1968) (summarizing debate, but concluding that discretion afforded by Terry can be adequately controlled).
6. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 5, at 185 (concluding that police might abuse
"self-protective frisk" and intrude on individual's constitutional rights); Wypiski,
supra note 5, at 151 (finding that police officer's determination of probable cause
would not protect citizen from unwarranted invasions).
7. See generally Morgan Cloud, Note, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in
Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REv. 199, 230-231 (1993) (discussing Terry's
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Immediately after Terry was decided, the government exerted
pressure to extend the scope of the holding to permit the police to
search not merely for weapons, but also for any contraband or criminal evidence officials suspect will be found on the defendant's person. The courts have resisted this pressure, repeatedly suppressing
evidence seized in Terry frisks that went beyond the permitted
search for weapons. Nevertheless, the permission to search combined with the belief that the defendant possesses some evidence of
criminal activity creates too great a temptation for law enforcement
officials. Many cases illustrate encounters in which police officers
unabashedly overstepped the limitations Terry established with regard to seeking and finding nonweapon evidence.
In 1993, in Minnesota v. Dickerson, the Court clarified the extent
of police authority to seize items felt during a Terry pat down
search.8 Two Minneapolis police officers stopped Dickerson after
he left a suspected "crack" house. 9 The officer who frisked Dickerson for weapons felt a lump in the pocket of Dickerson's nylon
coat. 10 Although the officer knew the lump was not a weapon, he
manipulated the lump with his fingers to determine what it was.1 1
Deciding that "it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane,"
the officer removed the item from Dickerson's pocket. 12 His assessment was correct, and Dickerson was prosecuted for possession of a
controlled substance. 13 Dickerson's claim that the seizure of the
cocaine violated his Fourth Amendment rights eventually reached
the Supreme Court. The Court acknowledged that touch could
provide information that would warrant a seizure, but held that the
officer's manipulation of the lump went beyond the scope of a
14
weapons frisk and violated Dickerson's constitutional rights.
While arguably broadening police authority to search and seize
nonweapon contraband during a Terry stop, the Court simultaneously reaffirmed previous restrictions on police authority. The
place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and concluding that reasonable suspicion is even more ambiguous than probable cause).
8. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 366-67 (holding that search is not valid if it goes beyond what is necessary to determine if suspect is armed).
9. See id. at 368 (noting that officer had previously responded to complaints of
drug sales in hallways of "crack house").
10. See id. at 369 (finding that officer examined lump with his fingers and "it
slid").
11. See id. at 378 (stating that officer never thought lump was weapon).
12. Id. at 369.
13. See id. (noting that small plastic bag contained one-fifth of one gram of

crack cocaine).
14. See id. at 378 (holding that continued exploration of suspect's pocket was
not justified).
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Court recognized the plain feel doctrine, concluding that an officer's sense of touch may provide probable cause to seize an item
detected during an authorized touch of the person. 15 The Court
held, however, that a Teny frisk for weapons is strictly circumscribed
and does not permit an officer to probe an object that does not feel
like a weapon. 16 The plain feel doctrine, according to Dickerson,
permits seizure only if the nature of the object was immediately apparent to the officer during the pat down.
Reactions to Dickerson have been mixed. Some applaud the decision as a rational application of accepted Fourth Amendment
principles, 1 7 and many state courts have adopted the plain feel doctrine as an aspect of state constitutional protection.' 8 Other com15. See id. at 375 (stating that if contour or mass makes object "immediately
apparent," then there is no unreasonable invasion of suspect's rights).
16. See id. at 378 (noting that officer was only able to identify lump as contraband after "squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating" it).
17. See, e.g.,
Andrew Agati, Note, The Plain Feel Doctrine of Minnesota v. Dickerson: Creatingan Illusion, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV.927, 928-29 (1995) ("[T]he Dickerson ruling will prove to be a sensible decision that will not further erode the Fourth
Amendment.").
18. See State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1103-13 (Conn. 1996) (applying plain
feel doctrine and upholding seizure of cocaine felt during pat down); People v.
Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (Ill. 1995) (upholding seizure of object that felt
like rock cocaine under plain feel doctrine); State v. Wonders, 929 P.2d 792, 797801 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (adopting plain feel exception but not allowing seizure
of marijuana because it was not immediately apparent to officer that object was
contraband); Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 650-52 (Ky. 1994) (limiting application of plain feel doctrine as approved in Dickerson); State v. Burton,
556 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding seizure of crack cocaine
taken from suspect's sock during pat down for weapons under plain feel exception); State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 35 (Mo. 1996) (adopting plain feel doctrine
and permitting seizure of pill bottle containing cocaine), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.
1713 (1997); In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 925-29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (upholding
seizure of "baggie" from juvenile's waistband under plain feel doctrine); Graham v.
State, 893 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (adopting plain feel exception for
seizure of objects whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent); State v.
Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 165-67 (Wash. 1994) (justifying seizure if police officer recognized object to be block of cocaine during pat down).
Some state courts apply Dickerson without considering whether plain feel comports with state constitutional law. See Huffman v. State, 651 So. 2d 78, 81 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1994) (admitting drugs discovered during pat down because officer
did not have to "wiggle" object to know its identity); Dickerson v. State, 909 S.W.2d
653, 654 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding seizure of 14 rocks of cocaine detected
during pat down);Jordan v. State, 664 So. 2d 272, 272-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(citing Dickerson but concluding that seizure was not justified under plain feel doctrine); Bratcher v. State, 661 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding
seizure of plastic bag of marijuana); State v. Livings, 664 So. 2d 729, 733-34 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (applying plain feel doctrine to justify police officer reaching up under
suspect's shirt to seize crack pipe); Jones v. State, 682 A.2d 248, 251 n.4 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996) (proceeding on "assumption" that plain feel doctrine applied
without deciding question); Commonwealth v. Lopez, No. 9577CR-3107, 1996 WL
339948, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 21, 1996) (upholding seizure of crack cocaine
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mentators and courts, however, predict that the decision will erode
Fourth Amendment protection because the courts cannot or will
not maintain the restrictions affirmed by the Supreme Court. 19 A
detected in pat down); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Mich. 1996)
(applying Dickerson and upholding seizure of pill bottle from suspect's sweatpants);
State v. Craven, 560 N.W.2d 512, 513-14 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (following Dickerson
and upholding search which uncovered spark plug that officer believed was marijuana pipe); State v. Jackson, 648 A.2d 738, 740 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(applying Dickerson and holding seizure of plastic bags filled with cocaine invalid);
State v. Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387, 387-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding seizure of
cocaine from suspect's breast pocket valid under Dickerson); State v. Hunter, 649
N.E.2d 289, 290-92 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (applying Dickerson and upholding
seizure of cocaine after officer witnessed suspicious transfer of "wadded-up plastic
bag"); State v. Bridges, No. 02C01-9412-CC-00298, 1995 WL 764998, at *5-6 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1995) (finding seizure of pill bottle valid under Dickerson);
State v.Johnson, 522 N.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1994) (holding seizure of
film canister invalid under Dickerson because officer shook canister and determined contents were "light in weight" and might be marijuana seeds); cf People v.
Limon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 402-05 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Dickersonapprovingly,
but resolving issue on other grounds); People v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 871-72
(Colo. 1993) (applying Dickerson and concluding that search of "fanny pack" following pat down exceeded scope of that permitted under federal constitution but
not reaching plain feel question); State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 349 (Iowa 1994)
(citing Dickerson and holding that officer stayed within confines of Terry frisk because once she determined object was not weapon, she did not manipulate it further, but inquired and was told it was marijuana); State v. Hayes, 535 N.W.2d 715,
722-23 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Dickerson, but upholding seizure of three and
one-half ounces of crack cocaine on basis of search incident to arrest). The legal
posture of the Arizona courts on the question of plain feel is somewhat unclear.
The court of appeals apparently applied Dickerson in State v. Sigro, No. 1CA-CR 930681, 1995 WL 13556 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1995), but later withdrew its opinion.
In In re Pima County Juvenile Delinquency Action, 891 P.2d 243, 246 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995), the court held that the seizure of a soft object from the juvenile's pocket
was not a valid plain feel seizure under Dickerson. Id. The court distinguished Sigro
on the ground that, unlike the officer in Sigro, the officer who seized the drugs did
not testify that "he knew as soon as he felt it that the minor had drugs in his
pocket." Id.
In addition, some states applied plain touch in decisions predating Dickerson
and have not revisited the question since the Supreme Court's decision. See Dickerson v. State, No. 228, 1993 WL 22025, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 1993) (applying pre-Dickerson federal law and concluding that seizure of crack vials was
justified under plain feel); State v. Alamont, 577 A.2d 665, 667-69 (R.I. 1990) (upholding seizure of crack vials identified by touch during pat down); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that plain view
doctrine permitted officer to remove and examine packet which frisk revealed
under suspect's sock); see also State v. Ortiz, 683 P.2d 822, 824 (Haw. 1984) (applying plain feel reasoning to officer's detection of gun in knapsack); State v. Zearley,
444 N.W.2d 353, 356-59 (N.D. 1989) (citing plain feel decision favorably and remanding for further proceedings to determine whether officer thought suspect
was armed), appeal after remand, 468 N.W.2d 391 (N.D. 1991).
19. SeeJohn A. Cecere, Note, Searches Woven From Terry Cloth: How the Plain
Feel Doctrine Plus Terry Equals Pretextual Search, 36 B.C. L. REv. 125, 150-54 (1994)
(arguing that plain feel doctrine will lead to "far more intrusive, if not pretextual
searches"); Eric B. Liebman, Note, The Future of the Fourth Amendment After Minnesota v. Dickerson - A "Reasonable"Proposal44 DEPAUL L. REv. 167, 213 (1994) (stating that "plain feel exception will expand the definition of the warrantless seizure
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review of the decisions since Dickerson reveals that those predictions
were accurate.
III.

Drc"ciRsoN's PLACE

IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:

NOTHING

NEW UNDER DICKRSON?

Many of the searches and seizures currently evaluated under
the plain feel doctrine resemble intrusions previously assessed
under different Fourth Amendment doctrines. To the extent that
these intrusions would have been permitted by pre-Dickerson doctrine, Dickerson's impact may be inconsequential. Prior to Dickerson,
two rules were critical to law enforcement's ability to discover evidence and contraband without probable cause to believe it was
present. First, permission to conduct a weapons frisk under the authority of Terry allows the police to discover both weapons and items
resembling weapons if officers have a reasonable suspicion that the
person they are detaining is armed and presents a violent threat.
Second, permission to search incident to arrest allows police to discover items concealed on or near an arrestee once they acquire
probable cause to arrest. These two rules permit law enforcement
officers to justify many discoveries of contraband or evidence. Dickerson becomes significant only when the police discover evidence
while acting outside the range of authority defined by the two preexisting rules.
A.

Weapons Searches

Terry established the government's authority to search for
weapons long before Dickerson was decided.2 0 Therefore, without
relying on Dickerson, the government can justify seizing any object
beyond that contemplated by the Terry reasonableness standard"); Stacey Paige
Rappaport, Note, Search and Seizure-Stop and Frisk-PoliceMay Seize Nonthreatening
ContrabandDetected Through the Sense of Touch During a Protective Pat Down Search So
Long As the Search Stays Within the Bounds Marked by Terry v. Ohio-Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 2257, 2315-16 (1994) (describing inherent diffi-

culty in Dickerson rule because its application is impractical); see also Lawrence J.
Wadsack, The Plain Touch Doctrine and the Confusion Following United States v. Dickerson: The Terry Frisk Needs an Expansion, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1053, 1097-98 (1995)
(arguing that Dickerson should have expanded scope of Teny frisks). Some courts
have rejected the plain feel doctrine under their state constitutions. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299-301 (N.Y. 1993) (remarking that "the claimed
analogy to the plain view exception does not withstand analysis" and holding that
plain view is not consistent with New York State Constitution).
20. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1968) (establishing grounds for police
officers to conduct protective pat-down search). The Terry Court held that:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individ-
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felt during a search that is of sufficient hardness and size that it may
be a weapon. 2 1 For example, in People v. Limon,22 the officer was
justified in removing a hide-a-key box from the defendant's pocket
23
because the hard, rectangular object felt like a possible weapon.
24
Similarly, in State v. Goodman, the court held that a detective who
was authorized to frisk the defendant could lawfully seize a crack
pipe (described as "a three- to four-inch-long glass vial with one
25
jagged, pointed edge") because it felt like a weapon.
In some cases, the government invokes the authority to frisk
for weapons to support the seizure of objects that share few characteristics with a gun or knife, arguing that they felt sufficiently

ual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.
Id. at 26.
21. See United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding seizure of money because it felt like possible weapon); Roberts v. State,
386 S.E.2d 921, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding seizure of plastic bag containing four plastic baggies of cocaine on grounds that officer thought small bulge
might be pocketknife); Drake v. State, 655 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(upholding seizure of cocaine inside roll of cash because officer thought it might
be can of mace); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 171-72 (Ohio 1993) (upholding
seizure of wad of cash and packet of crack cocaine because officer could not discount possibility that object was knife or other weapon). For a further discussion
of the seizure of objects which feel like weapons, see infra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
In addition, officers may be permitted to seize items that feel like ammunition. See Scott v. State, 877 P.2d 503, 509 (Nev. 1994) (finding it reasonable to
seize shotgun shells which officer felt in suspect's pocket during pat down). But see
State v. Hensley, 770 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (remarking that "no
reasonably prudent man could possibly be in fear that the vial in Hensley's shirt
pocket that [the officer] thought was a bullet... was a weapon that could be used
by [the defendants] to endanger the safety of the two officers").
22. 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397 (Ct. App. 1993).
23. Id. at 403 (holding that hide-a-key magnetic box, in addition to other circumstances, indicated suspect was dealing drugs).
24. No. 68934, 1996 WL 50826 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 8, 1996).
25. Id. at *2 (upholding seizure of crack pipe with cocaine residue); see also
T.P. v. State, 585 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that vial of
cocaine was properly seized because it felt like "new unconventional weapon");
State v. Stubbs, 892 P.2d 547, 552 (Mont. 1995) (upholding seizure of brass pipe
that felt like "deadly weapon such as a knife or derringer"); James v. Commonwealth, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92-93 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding seizure of glass smoking device containing cocaine residue because officer believed it to be weapon).
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weapon-like to justify the seizure. 2 6 For example, in Allen v. State,27
the prosecution successfully argued that the police officer was justified in moving his hand repeatedly over an envelope containing
marijuana because he wanted to verify it did not contain a razor
bladeY8 In Williams v. Commonwealth,99 the court upheld the seizure
of currency (a roll of eleven bills) because the officer could reasonably have believed it was a weapon. 30 Of course, if courts accept
these arguments, the Terry frisk becomes more expansive, increasing the likelihood that an officer conducting a frisk will acquire
tactile information justifying a seizure under the plain feel
doctrine.
B.

Search Incident to Arrest

Incident to a lawful arrest, the police have authority to search
an arrestee's person and the surrounding area, including containers.31 When the police arrest a defendant, they are entitled to conduct a thorough search, regardless of whether they have any basis to
believe they will find contraband or evidence. The key to a valid
search incident to arrest is probable cause to arrest. Courts sometimes recognize authority to conduct a search incident to arrest
even before the police effect a formal arrest, provided they have
32
probable cause.
26. See United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding
seizure of money clip and cocaine valid); State v. Morrow, 603 A.2d 835, 836-38
(Del. 1992) (upholding seizure of tightly wrapped plastic bags containing vials of
cocaine); Jackson v. State, 669 N.E.2d 744, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing
seizure of medicine container on grounds that it could contain razor blades);
Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding seizure of
tightly rolled plastic bag of marijuana); see also Stubbs, 892 P.2d at 555 (Trieweiler,
J., dissenting) (noting that officer who conducted in-court demonstration of pat
down did not seize brass pipe that was subject of suppression motion and allegedly
felt like possible weapon).
27. 689 So. 2d 212 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
28. Id. at 216 (moving hands over pocket was not intrusive because officer was
justified in making sure envelope did not contain razor blade).
29. 354 S.E.2d 79 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
30. Id. at 87 (noting that officer testified roll of bills felt hard and was not
"soft like a piece of cotton").
31. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that
search of arrestee includes person and containers found on person such as "crumpled cigarette package"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (holding
that arresting officer may reasonably search person arrested and area within person's "immediate control"); United States v. Maldonado-Espinosa, 968 F.2d 101,
104 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding search of carry-on luggage within arrestee's reach);
State v. LeBlanc, 347 A.2d 590, 593 (Me. 1975) (upholding search of arrestee's
jacket located eight to ten feet from suspect).
32. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) ("Where the formal
arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's per-
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In some cases, the court has bypassed the government's plain
feel argument and held instead that the seizure of the evidence in
question occurred in the course of a valid search incident to
arrest.33 In State v. Hayes,34 for example, the court held that the
seizure of drugs from the defendant's pocket, while not justified by
the plain feel doctrine, was justified incident to arrest. 35 Information concerning the defendant from other sources gave the police
probable cause to arrest him. 3 6 Similarly, in Speight v. United

States,37 the court held that, although the officer was not authorized
to seize keys from the defendant's pocket during a frisk, the police
would inevitably have discovered the keys incident to the defend-

son, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest
rather than vice versa."); LeBlanc, 347 A.2d at 593 (holding that search of jacket
located eight to ten feet from suspect was valid search incident to arrest even
though arrest occurred after search); Commonwealth v. Lopez, No. 9577CR-3107,
1996 WL 339948, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 21, 1996) (finding that officers had
probable cause to arrest defendant and could search incident to arrest after feeling uniquely shaped object under defendant's shirt containing crack cocaine);
People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 861 (Mich. 1996) (upholding officer's opening of pill bottle containing cocaine because officer had probable cause to arrest
before removing bottle); State v. Cornell, 491 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that officer conducted valid search incident to arrest because officer had probable cause to arrest prior to seizure); Ellis v. State, 573 So. 2d 724,
726 (Miss. 1990) (upholding seizure of bag during search because officer had
probable cause and formal arrest followed quickly after challenged search); State
v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (upholding seizure of cocaine following pat down because officer had probable cause and arrest followed
quickly).
33. See, e.g., People v. Limon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 403 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding seizure and search of hide-a-key box valid part of search incident to arrest for
drugs); King v. State, No. 149-1993, 1993 WL 445484, at *2 (Del. Nov. 1, 1993)
(finding that tip from reliable informant together with detective's observations
constituted probable cause); State v. Morgan, No. 93-2089-CR, 1994 WL 495642, at
*3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1994) (holding that once officers found gun on defendant, they could arrest and search, allowing pills and pipes discovered during valid
search incident to arrest to be admissible evidence).
34. 535 N.W.2d 715 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
35. Id. at 720 (finding that suspect refused to consent to search following pat
down so police obtained search warrant and found 3.5 ounces of cocaine valued at
$2000 per ounce).
36. See id. at 721 (finding that previously reliable informant said suspect had
large amounts of cocaine and was "actively selling"-facts that were corroborated
by law enforcement officers).
37. 671 A.2d 442 (D.C.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 375 (1996).
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ant's arrest. 3 s The officer had gathered information amounting to
39
probable cause to arrest from other sources.
C.

The Relationship Between Search Incident to Arrest and Plain Feel
Most plain feel cases would be better evaluated as searches inci-

dent to arrest. A majority of the cases involve detection and seizure
of drugs carried on the person who is patted down. 40 The prosecution's plain feel argument is that the tactile information obtained

by patting the defendant provided probable cause to believe the felt
object was drugs and that the seizure was therefore justified. If a
police officer has probable cause to believe a defendant has drugs
on his or her person, however, the officer has probable cause to
effect an arrest for possession of a controlled substance. In many
plain feel cases, then, the officer could have arrested the defendant
without seizing the drugs if the pat down yielded probable cause.
Some judges have recognized the relationship between the two doctrines, arguing that the prosecution should prevail in plain view

cases only if the search withstands scrutiny as a search incident to
4

arrest. '
In Dickerson, however, the Supreme Court disregarded this relationship, treating plain feel as closely related to the plain view doctrine. 4 2 The basic holding that an officer can acquire information
contributing to probable cause through the sense of touch applies
38. Id. at 445 (holding that keys were admissible because they would have
been discovered incident to arrest); see State v. Matthews, 654 So. 2d 868, 871-72
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (appearing to confuse search incident to arrest and pat down
for weapons when court properly upheld search but relied on Dickerson even
though officer had probable cause to arrest before searching defendant).
39. See Speight, 671 A.2d at 453 (holding that informant's detailed tip together
with report of weapons and smell of PCP constituted probable cause).
40. See, e.g., Dickerson v. State, 909 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) (seizing 14 rocks of cocaine); State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1103 (Conn. 1996) (seizing
cocaine felt during pat down); People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ill.
1995) (seizing object that felt like rock cocaine); Bratcher v. State, 661 N.E.2d 828,
830 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (involving seizure of plastic bag containing marijuana);
State v. Wonders, 929 P.2d 792, 794 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (seizing marijuana);
State v. Burton, 556 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (involving crack cocaine taken from suspect's sock); State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Mo. 1996)
(seizing pill bottle containing cocaine), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1713 (1997); State v.
Wilson, 437 S.E.2d 387 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (confiscating cocaine from suspect's
breast pocket); State v. Hunter, 649 N.E.2d 289, 292 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (seizing
cocaine in "wadded-up plastic bag").
41. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 303 (N.Y. 1993) (Simons, J., dissenting) (advocating analyzing plain feel case as search incident to arrest); State v.
Hudson, 848 P.2d 216, 219-20 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (evaluating seizure of cocaine
as search incident to arrest), rev'd, 874 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1994).
42. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 370 (1993).
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equally to arrest or to plain view. A quick review of the plain view
doctrine, however, reveals how poorly it fits the facts of Dickerson
and similar cases. The plain view doctrine justifies seizure of an
object only if the officer is lawfully present in a position to seize the
object in question without further invasion of privacy. 43 In plain
feel cases, by contrast, the officer is never in a position to seize without the additional privacy intrusion of reaching inside the clothing
or container through which the officer felt the evidence. 44 The better approach would have been to recognize that once the officer
acquires probable cause to believe that the defendant's pocket contains contraband, the officer can arrest the defendant and search
the pocket incident to arrest.
D.

The Role of Dickerson

The plain feel doctrine occupies a narrow place in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence because the government can often justify seizing felt evidence without invoking the doctrine. 45 The plain
feel doctrine is essential only to justify seizing a nonweapon-like
item recognizable by feel from a defendant whom the police do not
have probable cause to arrest. Thus, in the context of a pat-down
search or consent frisk, plain feel is a tool for an officer with a
hunch who is looking for evidence.
Dickerson merely holds that a law enforcement officer authorized to touch clothing or a container may thereby gather information and if the information gives the officer probable cause to
believe the felt object is contraband or evidence, the officer can
justify a further intrusion. 46 Because few seizable items other than
weapons can be identified by feel, one might expect plain feel to be
a tool of limited utility. On the contrary, many cases report prosecution reliance on Dickerson and plain feel to justify seizures.
43. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (noting that
plain view doctrine operates on premise that police officer "had a prior justification for [the] intrusion [during] which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused").
44. See Diaz, 612 N.E.2d at 302 (stating that even if intrusion inherent in initial act of touching is entirely authorized, discovery and seizure of items will entail
further intrusion).
45. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1968) (allowing officer to seize
weapon-like evidence found in protective pat-down search).

46. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 374 (holding that if officer acquires probable
cause to believe defendant possesses contraband, then officer has probable cause
to arrest and can seize object in course of search incident to arrest); see also Robert
Fraser Miller, "IWant To Stop This Guy!" Some "Touchy" Issues ArisingFrom Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 71 N.D. L. REv. 211, 246-47 (1995) (presenting hypothetical demon-

strating how police officers may make further intrusion).
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In some cases, the prosecution has invoked plain feel to justify
seizing something that was not on the defendant's person.4 7 For
example, in United States v. MacCready,48 an officer who was handing
the defendant his backpack felt an object in the backpack that felt
like, and turned out to be, a gun. 49 The officer had no authority to
50
pat down the backpack, but was authorized to handle it briefly.
Having felt the gun during this brief contact, the officer could lawfully act on the tactile information. 51 In cases like MacCready, the
prosecution must not only persuade the court that the officer recognized the concealed object from its tactile characteristics, but
must also justify the contact with the container. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Robinson,52 the court easily concluded that the officer who seized a bag from a window sill could use his sense of
touch to detect the cocaine in the bag. 53 The pivotal question in

47. See Pena v. State, 904 S.W.2d 850, 853-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding
seizure of drugs found during weapons frisk of defendant's purse); State v. Johnson, 522 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting argument that plain
touch permitted conservation warden to seize and shake film canister from hunter
"shining" deer). But see State v. Millan, 916 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that Dickersondoes not apply to police manipulation of suitcase to determine whether it contained drugs).
48. 878 F. Supp. 976 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
49. Id. at 978 (stating that officer believed object was gun and not "tattooing
pen" as suspect claimed). The authority to search the backpack did not come
from the officer's search of the vehicle. See id. at 980. The court stated that "it
would not be a Fourth Amendment violation to remove the backpack and hand it
to the Defendant during the course of an otherwise valid search of the car." Id.
The court also noted that "the officer would have felt the gun from a 'lawful vantage point' and the rationale behind the plain view doctrine would apply." Id.
50. See id. (finding that officer did not squeeze or manipulate backpack to
determine identity of object). The court took testimony from the defendant and
from the officers about whether the item was immediately recognized as contraband. See id. "After evaluating the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses," the
court found that the weapon was immediately recognized by the officers as contraband. Id.
51. See id. (finding that consensual search did not extend to backpack, but did
permit officer to touch backpack).
52. 651 A.2d 1121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
53. Id. at 1124 (determining that "firm and kind of crumbly" feel of object
together with officer's extensive experience justified conclusion that object contained narcotics); see also MacCready, 878 F. Supp. at 980 (holding that officer had
authority to handle backpack in which gun was detected); Pitman v. Commonwealth, 896 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that marijuana contained in garbage bags and sitting near defendant on roadside must be suppressed
because police acted without authority when they "picked up and felt" bags); State
v. Johnson, 522 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that warden exceeded scope of consent when he picked up and shook film canister he observed
in defendant's glove compartment).
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the case was whether the police had a basis to seize the bag in the
54
first instance.
More often, however, plain feel cases fall into a predictable pattern. The prosecution most often invokes the doctrine to uphold a
seizure of drugs, drug paraphernalia or evidence of drug trafficking
from the defendant's person.5 5 The touching typically occurs during a Terry frisk or a consensual pat down following an authorized
stop.
Three reasons can be proffered for the disproportionate use of
plain feel in drug cases. First, courts often hold that authority to
frisk follows virtually automatically when the police stop a defendant on suspicion of drug-related activity, reasoning that drug trafficking is violent and drug use may precipitate violence.5 6 Second,
when the police frisk a defendant suspected of illegal drug activity,
the police expect (or hope) to find drug-related evidence and will
54. See Robinson, 651 A.2d at 1125. In his dissenting opinion, however, Judge
Olszewski argued that in addition to determining whether probable cause existed
to believe that the bag contained drugs, the court must also determine whether
the officer's conduct following the establishment of probable cause was proper.
See id. at 1126 (Olszewski, J., dissenting). Addressing this question, Judge Olszewski found that, although probable cause to search the bag existed, the officers
should have procured a warrant before searching the bag. See id. (Olszewski, J.,
dissenting). Judge Olszewski reasoned that because no exigent circumstances were
present, there was nothing preventing the police from merely detaining the bag
and procuring a search warrant in order to ensure the defendant's privacy rights.
See id. (Olszewski, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Rivers, 121 F.3d 1043, 1046 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument by defendant that police officer exceeded boundaries outlined
in Dickerson when lump of crack cocaine was discovered after pat down).
Some cases involve evidence of nondrug-related crime. See, e.g., United States
v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1986) (seizing of lock-picking case identified through tactile examination of case); State v. Jones, No. CA 14390, 1994 WL
660754, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (seizing of gun in paper bag under
plain feel); State v. Washington, 396 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Wis. 1986) (discovering
three watches during pat-down search).
56. See United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that
it is "not uncommon for drugs and guns to be associated"); State v. Curtis, 681 So.
2d 1287, 1292 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that stop was authorized because "drug
traffickers and users have a violent lifestyle"); Williams v. Commonwealth, 354
S.E.2d 79, 87 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (remarking that narcotic deal is kind of transaction that may give rise to "sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy
evidence"). But see Howard v. State, 623 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that search of suspect observed giving money in exchange for small
object was not justified); State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that drug use is not crime of violence comparable to drug dealing). See
generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.5(a), at 256 (1996) (commenting that dangerous propensities of drug
traffickers may form basis for police officer's reasonable belief that suspect is
armed and dangerous); Miller, supra note 46, at 264-70 (justifying suspicion that
suspects are armed and dangerous "given the violent nature of drug trafficking").
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interpret their tactile sensations accordingly. 57 Particularly in postDickerson cases, law enforcement officers often claim to recognize
58
drugs by feeling them through clothing or other containers.
Third, because we devote so many resources to the war on drugs
and because physical evidence is critical in drug prosecutions, a disproportionate number of cases addressing Fourth Amendment concerns are drug cases. 59 As a result of these three related factors, the
plain feel doctrine has its greatest significance as a weapon in the
war on drugs. Consequently, the fervor to win that war pressures
both the law enforcement community and the judiciary to expand
the plain feel doctrine just as it exerts pressure to erode Fourth
Amendment protection in other ways. 60 When the plain feel doc-

trine is applied expansively (whether as a result of this pressure or
57. See, e.g.,
Agati, supra note 17, at 937-39 (finding that officer's perception
in one case was "especially remarkable because this lump weighed 0.2 grams and
was no bigger than a marble").
58. See id. at 938 ("We are led to surmise that the officer's sense of touch must
compare with that of the fabled princess who couldn't sleep when a pea was hidden beneath her pile of mattresses.").
59. See Douglas 0. Linder, Trends in Constitution-Based Litigation in Federal
Courts, 63 UMKC L. Riv. 41, 59 (1994) ("Increasingly, the typical fourth amendment case considers the constitutionality of a search or seizure of drugs made in
anticipation of prosecution under federal drug laws. In 1968 and 1969, about 29%
of fourth amendment cases involved drug offenses. By 1980, the percentage of
drug-related cases rose to 51%."); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on
ProceduralFairnessand RacialEquality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 240 (commenting
on use of Fourth Amendment in war on drugs). In his article, Rudovsky states:
The heavy reliance we place on the criminal sanction side of drug policy
places a premium on police seizures of controlled substances and the
apprehension and arrest of those involved in their distribution and possession. Accordingly, just as the First Amendment became the battleground for laws restricting free speech during the First World War and
the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Fourth Amendment has become
the focal point for resolving issues of governmental power in implementing the War on Drugs.
Id.; see alsoJohn B. Owens, Note, Judge Baer and the Politics of the Fourth Amendment:
An Alternative to Bad Man Jurisprudence,8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 189, 190 (1997)
(discussing cases involving Fourth Amendment and drugs).
60. See Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural and Foreseeable
Consequence of the Plain View Doctrine,95 DICK. L. REv. 521, 552-55 (1991) (arguing
that growing difficulty of detecting drugs and "narcotic cancer" destroying nation's
families requires increase of police searches and use of plain feel exception); Lawrence J. Wadsack, The Plain Touch Doctrine and Confusion Following United States v.
Dickerson: The Terry Frisk Needs an Expansion, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1053, 1092-93
(1995) (arguing that Terry frisks should be expanded in light of strong government
interest in "combating illegal drugs"); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 519
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The special need for flexibility in uncovering
illicit drug couriers is hardly debatable."). Interestingly, in 1968, commenting on
Terry and Sibron, Professor LaFave remarked that the intrusions allowed by Terry
might be appropriate in cases of serious crimes, but not for less serious offenses
such as possession of narcotics. See LaFave, supra note 5, at 57-58.
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for other reasons), Fourth Amendment protection is effectively
reduced.
IV.

IMPACT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT BEHAVIOR

The Fourth Amendment seeks to restrict law enforcement conduct.6 1 As a result, any decision interpreting the Fourth Amend-

ment should have some impact-either desirable or undesirableon police behavior. The desirable impact of a decision would be
increased compliance with the Constitution. By contrast, an undesirable impact would be increased disregard for constitutional restrictions and consequent police violation of individual rights.
Dickerson's two seemingly contradictory aspects make its impact difficult to predict. On one hand, it reaffirms the strict limits on Terry
frisks. On the other hand, it recognizes that the police may use
their sense of touch to detect contraband and evidence and justify
seizing it. Thus, the net effect on law enforcement could be either
to discourage expansion of frisks into more general searches or to
encourage unconstitutional exploration of palpable evidence. The
police conduct reflected in the reported cases suggests that the latter effect has predominated.
Dickerson may affect law enforcement behavior in two different
settings. First, on the street, Dickerson may encourage the police to
be cautious in searching suspects; or, as appears more likely, Dickerson may tempt police to search more broadly, hoping to exploit any
opportunity to feel what is hidden in a subject's clothing or
container. The decision may also lead the police to invade a subject's privacy more broadly during a search by probing more aggressively for any identifiable object.

Second, in the courtroom,

Dickerson may encourage law enforcement witnesses to conform
their testimony to the most helpful legal standard by making exaggerated claims of tactile sensitivity or even committing peijury.
In People v. Mitchell,62 Justice Heiple recognized these dual concerns. He opposed adoption of the plain feel doctrine and argued
in dissent:
The "plain touch" doctrine will encourage officers to investigate any lump or bulge in a person's clothing or pock61. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... "); see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969)
("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry .....
62. 650 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. 1995).
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ets that arouses their curiosity during the course of a
patdown search. If the item turns out to be contraband,
then its seizure can be retrospectively justified. If it turns
out to be something else, then there is no case and the
matter ends there. In the interim, a citizen is subject to an
unwarranted intrusion into his personal privacy far beyond the intrusion contemplated by the weapons patdown
63
search.
The law enforcement community enhances the likely impact of

a decision by publishing reports about the case and its practical significance. Law enforcement publications address, and therefore
may influence, police behavior in both settings. The publications
detail the parameters of police authority. 64 In addition, the publications describe testimony that satisfies, or fails to satisfy, the courts'
requirements. 65 For example, the National District Attorney's Association distributes Case Commentaries & Briefs several times a year.
The publication reaches prosecutors and is passed on to police officers. 66 The publication regularly summarizes recent decisions
bearing on police practices and in some instances presents samples
of successful testimony.

63. Id. at 1025 (Heiple,J., dissenting). This language was quoted approvingly
by Justice Berdon of the Connecticut Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion
opposing adoption of the plain view doctrine in State v. Trine, 673 A.2d 1098, 1115
(Conn. 1996) (Berdon, J., dissenting).
64. See, e.g.,
LARRY E. HOLTZ, NEW JERSEY LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 435556 (1997) (discussing current NewJersey decisions regarding investigative detentions); LARRY E. HOLTZ, PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENFORCEMENT HANDBOOK 480-92
(1997) (presenting recent Pennsylvania decisions regarding scope of "stop and
frisk"); Commonwealth v. Austin: Search and Seizure, PROSECUTOR'S UPDATE (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, Harrisburg, PA.), Nov. 19,
1993, at 14-16 (commenting on Dickerson and Pennsylvania cases addressing plain
touch); A. Louis DiPietro, The "PlainFeel" Doctrine, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL.
(Federal Bureau of Investigations, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1994, at 27 (discussing
Teny and Dickerson); "PlainFeel" Doctrine Adopted, CASE COMMENTARIES & BRIEFS
(Nat'l District Atty's Ass'n, Alexandria, VA.), July-Aug. 1993, at 2-3 (reporting details of Alabama plain feel case); Plain Feel Doctrine Adopted in Pennsylvania, DELAWARE COUNTY DISTRICT Arr'ys BULL. (Office of the District Attorney of Delaware
County, Media, PA.), Oct. 1993, at 2 (summarizing Pennsylvania plain touch
decision).
65. See Stop and Frisk: Plain View Seizure, Plain Touch and Rock Cocaine, CASE
& BRIEFS (Nat'l District Atty's Ass'n, Alexandria, VA.),Jan. 1995, at
8 (reporting details of testimony which had satisfied Alabama court in plain feel
case); see also DiPietro, supra note 64, at 29-30 (quoting court's paraphrase of officer's testimony in successful plain feel case).
COMMENTARIES

66. Interview with Sheldon Kovach, Deputy District Attorney of Delaware
County, in Media, Pa. (July, 1996).
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A.

On the Street

The law enforcement community may construe Dickerson as
granting permission to investigate any suspicious bulge. Even
though Dickerson emphasizes the limited scope of the frisk, it never-

theless opens the possibility that officers will seize interesting objects knowing that Dickerson supplies a supporting argument to raise

in court if the defense moves to suppress the evidence.
The law enforcement literature communicates the utility of
plain feel as well as its limitations, and officers may receive that
message. In Jones v. State,67 for example, the court noted that the
officer testified that "he had proceeded to seize the substance based
on his vague knowledge of Minnesota v. Dickerson."68 The officer
stated that "[t]he vagueness of his knowledge... also caused him to
think it wiser not to arrest the petitioner immediately and to get a
69
second opinion regarding the legality of his actions.
It appears that the officer in Jones was not unusual. A number
of decisions applying Dickerson report searches in which the police
failed to stay within permissible bounds. In some cases, the police
probed or manipulated without authority. 70 In others, the police
seized objects, later offered as evidence by prosecutors, that had no
special characteristics identifiable by touch. 7 1 For example, in various cases, the prosecution has offered items described as: hard, soft,
powdery, granular, square, round, flat and tubular. 72 One officer
testified that he felt "a tubular object" and thought it was "a Life
Saver Hole candy container, which is a common container used by
67. 682 A.2d 248 (Md. 1996).
68. Id. at 257 n.12.
69. Id.
70. For a further discussion of cases in which contraband only became apparent after it was probed and manipulated during a Terry protective search, see infra
notes 161-85 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., People v. Massey, 558 N.W.2d 253, 254-56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(involving pill bottle tucked inside suspect's pants near groin); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 685 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting seizure of envelope
containing vehicle information relating to stolen car because there was no evidence that it was identifiable as contraband).
72. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 386 S.E.2d 921, 925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
seizure of plastic bag containing four plastic baggies of cocaine valid because officer thought small bulge might be pocketknife); Drake v. State, 655 N.E.2d 574,
577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding seizure of cocaine inside roll of cash because
officer thought it might be can of mace); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 171-72
(Ohio 1993) (holding seizure of wad of cash and packet of crack cocaine valid
because officer could not discount possibility that object was knife or other
weapon); State v. Johnson, 522 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
seizure of film canister invalid because officer shook canister and determined contents were "light in weight" and might be marijuana seeds).
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crack dealers to carry their crack cocaine in"; the object turned out
to be a brown medicine bottle containing crack cocaine. 73 Another
officer testified that the object he seized felt "like it may have been
a bindle of drugs" and felt "like a small gumball"; it turned out to
be a fraction of an ounce of cocaine wrapped in plastic. 7 4 The

range of descriptions of the tactile information that prompt seizure
suggest that the police are fishing for evidence, and when they
make a catch, the prosecution is trying to use the plain feel doctrine to avoid suppression.
Still, we cannot determine with certainty the impact Dickerson
will have on police behavior on the street. Police officers do not
always conform their conduct to the Constitution, 75 and cases report similar seizures predating Dickerson. For example, In re Coleman76 evaluates the constitutionality of a seizure of items including
small packets of marijuana and a plastic bag containing crack cocaine rocks. 7 7 The officer who felt the objects testified that they
"could [have been] anything" and that "anytime I feel something
that's in the pocket I am going to check it out. ' 78 Although the
Coleman case was decided after Dickerson, the search occurred in October 1992 and, thus, provides an example of how police officers
were performing these type of seizures prior to the Supreme Court
79
decision in Dickerson.
73. State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1996). In this case, the officers
knew of previous incidents involving drugs and the defendants. See id. at 31. In
fact, one officer previously executed search warrants at the address where the defendant was found. See id. This officer testified that he believed the container held
crack cocaine and that "[h]e based this belief on the information received from
Rhodes, the area they were in, and his previous training and experience." Id.
74. Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Ky. 1994). A "bindle"
of drugs is defined as "asmall package, envelope or paper containing a narcotic
(as morphine, heroin, or cocaine)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY 217 (3d ed. 1976); see also Guy v. Wisconsin, 509 U.S. 914 (1993) (involving seizure of baggie containing bindles of cocaine); Tuitavake v. I.N.S., 85 F.3d
638, n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that there is no great difference between "bindles"
and "bundles"); Hood v. Lewis, No. 94-15755, 1994 WL 551475, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct.
6, 1994) (involving "bindle" of white powder assumed to be cocaine).
75. See, e.g., State v. Denis, 691 So. 2d 1295, 1298-99 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that officer testified that he was trained to pat down every pedestrian he
stopped, reflecting no awareness of requirement that he have reasonable suspicion
that individual is armed and dangerous).
76. No. 65459, 1993 WL 541582 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1993).
77. Id. at *S-7.
78. Id. at *5.
79. See id. at *1; see also People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Colo. 1989)
(holding officer violated defendant's rights by removing plastic bag containing
"several small rocks of crack cocaine which were about the size of four peas" from
defendant's pocket during weapons frisk); E.H. v. State, 593 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding search invalid where officer reached into suspect's
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While the plain touch doctrine clearly invites the police to engage in tactile exploration and to seize whatever feels interesting,
reported cases will never provide an accurate picture of on-thestreet practice. Tactile exploration yields evidence-admissible or
suppressible-in some instances, but undoubtedly yields nothing of
interest in a number of cases. Although the reported cases rarely
describe seizures that proved baseless, one must assume they occur.80 The police officer who seizes what feels like a Life Saver Hole
container or a gumball will, at least occasionally, find herself with a
handful of candy. Because the intrusive action yields no evidence,
no legal action is likely to follow, so judges will not hear of the
seizure and no decision will record it. Thus, the reported cases portray only a pattern of accurate tactile detection of contraband.
They do not reflect the instances in which the officer was mistaken.
Whenever an officer seizes an object based on slim information
obtained in the course of a pat down, the officer risks violating the
constitutionally protected privacy of the subject. If those violations
are not discouraged by judicial resistance to plain feel arguments,
Fourth Amendment protection will be persistently eroded.
pocket and seized cocaine in connection with noncriminal traffic violation); People v. Morales, 581 N.E.2d 730, 734-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (upholding seizure of
baggie containing contraband); State v. Hensley, 770 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (excluding contents of canister and vial taken from defendant's pockets during frisk); State v. Cartledge, 601 N.E.2d 157, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(holding seizure of pill vial during frisk invalid); State v. Eppinger, 599 N.E.2d 709,
711 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (finding seizure of cocaine during frisk invalid); State v.
Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (holding seizure of baggie
of cocaine during pat down invalid); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 318 (Wis. 1992)
(upholding seizure of cocaine in pat-down search).
80. See Kimbrew v. Evansville Police Dep't, 867 F. Supp. 818, 823-25 (S.D. Ind.
1994) (holding that officer violated complainant's constitutional rights when he
emptied complainant's pockets because he felt two "large clumps"); Hoey v. State,
689 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Del. 1997) (affirming ruling excluding testimony of witness
subjected to fruitless police search under circumstances similar to those under
which defendant was searched and found to have allegedly drug-related cash on
his person); see also Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation
as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1361
(1992) ("[I]t is the totally innocent person, who neither committed a traffic violation or petty crime nor carried evidence of a crime, who is least likely to receive
vindication for violated Fourth Amendment rights."); Joe Metcalfe, Anonymous
Tips, Investigatory Stops and InarticulateHunches-Alabama v. White, 26 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 219, 239 (1991) (arguing that potentially large number of innocent
men and women will suffer privacy intrusions of investigatory stops and protective
frisks); Miller, supra note 46, at 211 (hypothesizing fruitless but invasive application of plain feel); William J. Stuntz, Privacy'sProblem and the Law of CriminalProcedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016, 1064-65 (1995) (stating that it is stigmatizing to
innocent suspect to be stopped and searched by police); Cecere, supra note 19, at
125 (discussing invasive nature of plain feel).
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In the Courtroom

Regardless of whether on-the-street conduct has changed as a
result of Dickerson, in-court testimony clearly has. The decision offers the government a new after-the-fact justification for an additional range of intrusions, and one danger of Dickerson is this
invitation to retrospectively justify questionable seizures. If an officer can testify with sufficient confidence that the nature of the
item seized was immediately apparent from touching, the court is
likely to admit the evidence. Once the police have evidence, they
have a strong incentive to protect against suppression. That incentive can precipitate exaggerated testimony or even perjury.
Some officers display laudable candor in describing the infor81
mation obtained through a frisk. For example, in Howard v. State,
the officer testified that he felt "a bulge, 'a hard object in [defendant's] groin,"' and he "'didn't know what [he] was dealing with...
[but] knew there was an object down there that shouldn't be
there."' 8 2 Similarly, in C.D.T. v. State,8 3 the officer testified that he
felt a "crumbled plastic baggie"; however, he could not tell whether
it was full or empty. 84 Generally, such candid testimony will not
sustain the challenged seizure.

As a result, police officers' testimony often appears calculated
to meet the legal standard. In case after case, officers testify it was
81. 469 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
82. Id. at 748 (alterations in original). The testimony, taken with other evidence in the case, persuaded the court that the seizure was constitutional. See id. at
749. This conclusion is questionable. Although the defendant was acting nervous
when the police approached the car in which he was a passenger for a driving
infraction, nothing except defendant's demeanor and the fact he was traveling to
Georgia after a short stay in Florida suggested drug involvement. It appears that
the court may have upheld the seizure because the bulge could have been a
weapon. See In re Pima County Juvenile Delinquency Action, 891 P.2d 243, 246
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that officer who seized drugs from juvenile did not
claim that he immediately recognized object as drugs when he patted juvenile
down); Boatright v. State, 483 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
testimony was insufficient where officer testified that object, which turned out to
be marijuana, felt like "some type of plastic"); State v. Williams, 469 S.E.2d 261,
262-63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding testimony insufficient where officer testified,
in part, "I knew it was not a knife or a gun. I didn't know what it was" and "I could
pretty well tell that it was not crack cocaine or the feel of crack cocaine, that it was
a bag and that there was something in it. I did not know if it would be marijuana
or cocaine or heroin or what it might be"); People v. Massey, 558 N.W.2d 253, 255
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (noting officer testified only "[w]hen I touched it, I had
some idea what it was"); State v. Chitty, 559 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997)
(stating that officer testified that he couldn't tell what object, later discovered to
be methamphetamine, was by feel).
83. 653 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
84. Id. at 1046.
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"immediately apparent" that the object felt during the pat down was
contraband. 85 Law enforcement literature encourages this practice. For example, a January 1995 article summarizing Huffman v.
State86 quoted key passages from the witness' successful plain feel
testimony.8 7 The publication reported that:
A police officer who was able to articulate clearly on the
witness stand... that when he patted the defendant down
for a weapon's frisk (reasonable suspicion) he was ablebased on his experience-to immediately tell that a lump
in the defendant's pocket was rock cocaine, successfully
88
qualified for a plain feel seizure.
This type of publication apprises both the police and the prosecutors who prepare them to testify at trial of the words that have previously convinced or failed to convince other courts that the nature
of the felt object was immediately apparent.
The prosecutor's questioning can be designed to lead the law
enforcement witness to a satisfactory answer. For example, in State
v. Edwards,89 the prosecutor asked the officer: "When you felt that
hard object did it take a while did [sic] you have to feel it move it
around in his pocket to determine what it was or was it immediately
apparent to you on your first touch what the item was?" 9
85. See, e.g., United States v. MacCready, 878 F. Supp. 976, 980 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (stating that two officers involved in stop both testified that gun was "immediately apparent"); United States v. Mitchell, 832 F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (N.D. Miss.

1993) (noting that officers invoked their extensive law enforcement experience

and testified "that the crack cocaine was 'immediately apparent' upon feeling the
outer pocket of the jacket"); Allen v. State, 689 So. 2d 212, 213 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995) (believing officer who testified that he felt leafy substance through appellant's clothes that he "believed" to be marijuana while dissenting opinion argued
that contents of envelope could not have been "immediately apparent"); State v.
Wonders, 929 P.2d 792, 798 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that officer testified "it
was 'immediately apparent' to him that the pocket contained a baggie of marijuana"); State v. Johnson, 660 So. 2d 942, 948 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
officer testified that when he felt rock-like substance during pat-down frisk, he
"immediately believed" substance to be crack cocaine).
86. 651 So. 2d 78 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1994).
87. See Stop and Frisk: Plain View Seizure, Plain Touch; Rock Cocaine, supra note
65, at 8 (summarizing testimonry of witness in Alabama plain feel case).
88. Id. In addition, it reported that the officer testified: "From my pat down,
I could tell the outline of the rock without wiggling it around or anything like
that." Id. The officer also stated: "I have made several other arrests in which crack
cocaine was taken from the subject or crack cocaine was found on the subject. So I
can tell the general outline of what a crack cocaine rock is." Id.
89. No. 1996-CA-00047, 1996 WL 488805 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1996).
90. Id. at *3. Remarkably, this question did not draw an objection on grounds
of leading, and despite the prosecutor's suggestion, the officer testified that it was
not immediately apparent. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997

21

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42: p. 741

Revisiting pre-Dickerson cases in which the testimony was deficient, one can easily discern the potential for satisfying Dickerson by
altering the presentation at trial only slightly. For example, in Commonwealth v. Marconi,9 1 the officer stated that he felt something in
9
the defendant's back pocket that "felt like a rock or a pebble." 2

Given his knowledge of the defendant's arrest for methamphetamine manufacture and his experience with prior drug
seizures, the officer could easily have claimed that he immediately
recognized the object as methamphetamine. In Grangerv. State,93
the officer discovered cocaine at the defendant's waistline during a
frisk.9 4 He did not testify that he immediately recognized it as cocaine. Instead, the state relied on the totality of circumstances to
95
justify the intrusion and seizure.
V.

EVALUATION OF PLAIN FEEL SEIzuREs:

THE BURDEN ON THE

COURTS'

Some commentators criticize Dickerson for failing to provide
sufficient guidance. 96 Unfortunately, detailed guidance is rarely
feasible in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and Dickerson could
not easily detail its constitutional rule. Determining the propriety
of a search or seizure entails a fact-specific inquiry into the circumstances. One cannot expect the Supreme Court to catalogue every
item that may feel like a weapon or to describe the tactile sensations
that may establish probable cause to believe an object is seizable.
The Dickerson Court gave broad guidance while seeking to reinforce
limitations on governmental authority. First, while determining
that law enforcement may gather information through the sense of
91. 597 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
92. Id. at 618 n.5.
93. 423 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
94. Id. at 21.
95. See id. at 21-22; see also People v. Spann, 604 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (excluding evidence where officer testified that object "felt as if it had a
powdery consistency"); People v. Goodey, 584 N.E.2d 1021, 1023-24 (I11. App. Ct.
1991) (finding evidence inadmissible where officer testified that he felt "mushy
package in one of defendant's coat pockets . . . [and] could tell it was not a
weapon"); State v. Cartledge, 601 N.E.2d 157, 158 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that officer who seized pill vial during frisk provided no testimony concerning
what his tactile impressions suggested vial was).
96. See Barbara A. Doty, Minnesota v. Dickerson: Plain Touch Doctrine-Authorizing a Terry Stop and Search ForDrugs?,1994 Wis. L. Rrv. 1303, 1304 (1994) (stating

that decision fails to provide clear boundaries for subsequent applications of plain
touch exception); Rappaport, supra note 19, at 2318-19 ("[T]he Court has instead
engaged in irrational, piecemeal decisionmaking that has provided little
guidance.").
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touch, the Court required probable cause before a seizure. 9 7 Second, the Court reaffirmed the limitations on Terry frisks, holding
that the officer had overstepped his authority when he manipulated
the object in Dickerson's pocket. 98 Third, it approached with skepticism the officer's claim that the nature of the object was immediately apparent. 99 Thus, while accepting the plain feel doctrine, the
Court outlined a cautious approach to its implementation.
Once the Supreme Court defines the broad rule, other courts
bear the burden of adhering to Dickerson's approach and enforcing
the Fourth Amendment to restrict governmental abuse of plain
feel. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment depends on how these
courts execute their obligation. Trial courts have the front line
duty of gathering the facts and assessing the credibility of law enforcement officers who seek the benefit of plain feel. Appellate
courts play a critical role overseeing the application of the plain
view doctrine, insisting that the trial courts demand full governmental compliance with Fourth Amendment restrictions.
Unfortunately, some courts are too relaxed in their evaluation
of seizures when the government relies on the plain feel doctrine.
While most courts appear responsive to the specific line drawn in
Dickerson between the permissible weapons frisk and unpermitted
manipulation, a number of courts are too lax in enforcing the "immediately apparent" requirement. 0 0 The courts should recognize
that in-court testimony may not accurately reflect out-of-court
events. If the courts do not adhere to the cautious spirit of Dickerson, prosecutors may employ the plain feel doctrine to create inroads into Fourth Amendment protection.
A.

Limited Touching

The plain feel doctrine does not provide authority to touch. It
merely permits the officer to interpret tactile sensations to identify
the felt object. Authority to feel the object in the first instance must
97. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993) ("Regardless of
whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch, however, the

Fourth Amendment's requirement that the officer have probable cause to believe
that the item is contraband before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative
seizures.").
98. See id. at 378.

99. See id. But see Miller, supra note 46, at 212 (criticizing Dickerson Court for
accepting, without criticizing, officer's assertion that building which Dickerson had
left just before search was "crack house").
100. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 689 So. 2d 212, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (find-

ing seizure valid where officer testified that "he felt a package containing a leafy
substance he believed to be marijuana" through defendant's clothes).
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be found elsewhere. In many cases, as in Dickerson, the police officer derives authority from stop-and-frisk principles that allow the
officer to pat down the defendant for weapons. In many other
plain touch cases, the touching is justified by consent. 10 1 Occasionally, authority to touch rests on the officer's need to move an object
or other permitted police conduct that leads to inadvertent contact
with the object. 10 2 In every case, the officer's authority to engage in
tactile exploration is limited and it is critical that the courts enforce
those limitations. Given the limitations on the authority to search,
the court should ask in each case not only whether the felt object
could be recognized by touch, but also whether its tactile characteristics are so pronounced that it could be recognized within the
scope of the permitted search. If the courts too readily accept plain
feel arguments, they may unintentionally expand the scope of tactile exploration.
1. Defining the Scope of the Weapons Search
In Dickerson, the Court enforced strict limitations on the scope
of a Terry frisk. 0 3 The Court held that the officer's manipulation of
the object went beyond the authorized pat down and, therefore,
violated the Fourth Amendment. 10 4 Applying Dickerson, courts have
respected that limitation and have grappled with the scope of the
10 5
Terry weapons frisk.
101. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 645 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(concerning situation where defendant consented to weapons search); State v.
Jones, 653 A.2d 1040, 1043 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (involving suspect who gave
officer permission to check him for guns or drugs), rev'd, 682 A.2d 248 (Md. 1996).
These cases raise issues concerning the propriety of the initial stop and the meaning of voluntary consent. Discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article. For further discussion of consent searches, see Robert S. Carey, Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw-General Consent To Body Search For Drugs Includes Intimate Areas,
26 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1142 (1992); Joseph G. Casaccio, Note, Illegally Acquired
Information, Consent Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842 (1987);
Michael E. Postma, Comment, State v. Arroyo: Consent Searches FollowingIllegal Police
Conduct - Removing the Taint From the Fruitof the Poisonous Tree, 18J. CONTEMP. L. 107
(1992).
102. See, e.g., United States v. MacCready, 878 F. Supp. 976, 978 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (involving discovery of illegal gun during inadvertent contact with
backpack).
103. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378.
104. See id.
105. See, e.g., State v. Wonders, 929 P.2d 792, 800 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (suppressing evidence because officer continued to pat down defendant's pocket after
he determined it contained no weapon); In re B.C., 683 A.2d 919, 925-26 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (distinguishing between unpermitted sliding and manipulating
and permitted squeeze executed as part of Terry frisk); State v. Bridges, No. 02C019412-CC-00298, 1995 WL 764998, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1995) (emphasizing that officer "did not squeeze, slide or otherwise manipulate the object").
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765

In some cases, as in Dickerson, the officer manipulates an object
even though it does not have the tactile characteristics of a weapon.
When that occurs, the court should hold that the officer exceeded
the authority to search for weapons and should decline to permit
the prosecution to justify the seizure under the plain feel doctrine. 10 6 For example, in People v. Blake,10 7 the court rejected the
plain feel argument, remarking that "the tactile sensations involved
here could only have been the result of a grope, not a pat down,"
and thus held the seizure unconstitutional. 10 8 Occasionally, however, the courts have failed to enforce that limitation, eroding
Fourth Amendment protection. 10 9
Frequently, the pivotal question is whether the weapons search
ended before the officer gathered the tactile information on which
the plain feel claim is made. Some courts appear to define the end
of the weapons search by referring to the officer's state of mind,
examining whether the officer was satisfied that the defendant had
no weapons. 1" 0 Given the Court's reluctance to employ intent tests
to draw Fourth Amendment lines, this approach is unlikely to
prevail. 111
106. See Howard, 645 So. 2d at 159 (holding officers did not have authority to
shake or open canister).
107. 645 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
108. Id. at 583.
109. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 689 So. 2d 212, 215 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that officer stayed within Terry frisk when he passed his hand repeatedly over
envelope to ensure it did not contain razor blade and ultimately "simultaneously
recognized" that object was not weapon, but envelope of marijuana); Andrews v.
State, 471 S.E.2d 567, 568-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding seizure valid even
though officer squeezed object to affirm his initial belief that item was large piece
of crack cocaine); In re Carlton S. C.-B., No. 95-2252-FI, 1995 WL 737219, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1995) (affirming trial court's decision to admit package of
cocaine rocks about "one-quarter inch" around, although officer testified that, having felt something he "believed to be contraband" in defendant's pocket, he
"opened the jacket and pressed his open hand on it again").
110. See, e.g., Allen, 689 So. 2d at 215 (distinguishing Dickerson on grounds that
officer in this case discovered evidence before "he was convinced that what he felt
was not a weapon"); C.D.T. v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1041, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(condemning officer's seizure of cocaine in part because "he had already satisfied
himself" that the defendant possessed no weapons); State v. Abrams, 471 S.E.2d
716, 718 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that search should end when officer believes
defendant has no weapon); State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 167 (Wash. 1994) (remanding to trial court, in part, because trial court failed to determine whether
detective discovered drugs "before he knew the [d]efendant was unarmed").
111. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (rejecting Fourth
Amendment test based on officer's motives). In Whren, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that a stop violated the Fourth Amendment if it was pretextual (i.e., motivated by the officer's desire to investigate a different violation). Id.
at 1774. The Court stated: "Not only have we never held, outside the context of
inventory search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer's motive invali-
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More often, the courts permit the officer a thorough once-over
for weapons under Teny. The courts should not uphold a second
feel of any area unless the officer felt a possible weapon in the first
pass. Any additional patting down or any manipulation of an object
that does not have the characteristics of a weapon is beyond the
authorized weapon frisk and anything discovered as a result should
not justify a seizure. In State v. Hayes, for example, the court recognized the limitation on repeated touching and acknowledged that
the officer's second feel of the defendant to "confirm his suspicion
of the presence of a controlled substance" went beyond his limited
authority to pat down for weapons.'1 2 Even though the suspect
wore a long leather jacket, the officer did not feel a weapon-like
object and was, therefore, prohibited from groping or manipulating to determine whether the object was contraband. 113
2.

Defining the Scope of Consent

A number of plain feel cases arise from consent searches.
When police stop a suspect, but have no basis for searching, they
often seek and obtain consent. Plain feel cases most often involve
either consent to search for weapons or consent to search for weapons and drugs.
When the authority to touch rests on the defendant's consent,
the limits of the authority likewise depend on the consent. In F/orida v. Jimeno,114 the Supreme Court held that the scope of consent is
determined by a reasonableness standard; the critical question is
what the officer could reasonably conclude was within the scope of
the consent. 115 Applying this standard, courts may restrict application of the plain feel doctrine in consent searches. For example, in
Howard v. State,'1 6 the defendant's consent to a weapons search circumscribed the officer's authority and did not extend to the film
117
canister that the officer removed and shook.

dates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have
repeatedly held and asserted to the contrary." Id.
112. See State v. Hayes, 535 N.W.2d 715, 719-20 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995). The
court nevertheless upheld the seizure because the officer had probable cause to
arrest. See id. at 723. Therefore, the search and seizure were justified under the
search incident to arrest exception. See id. at 723-24. For a previous discussion of
Hayes, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
113. See Hayes, 535 N.W. 2d at 719.
114. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
115. Id. at 249.
116. 645 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. Id. at 157-58.
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In some instances, however, the defendant's consent is broad
enough to support extensive tactile investigation and resulting
seizures. For example, in State v. Jones,118 the court concluded that
the defendant had consented to be checked for weapons and
drugs. 1 19 The court noted that this consent search was less restricted than a Teny frisk, and, therefore, when the officer felt an
object in the defendant's pocket, he was not foreclosed from
120
squeezing it to get better tactile information.
B.

Immediately Apparent

Determining whether the nature or identity of the seized item
was immediately apparent to the feeling officer is critical to enforcing the limitations on Dickerson. Interpreting the plain view requirement in Arizona v. Hicks,121 the Court held that probable cause is

required to justify a warrantless seizure, eliminating debate over
whether "immediately apparent" defined an independent standard. 122 Thus, although Dickerson reverted to the use of "immediately apparent" to describe the standard for seizure, it is clear that,
like plain view, plain touch requires probable cause. 123 In Dickerson,
the officer's continued manipulation not only went beyond the authorized intrusion, but also belied any claim that it was immediately
apparent that the lump was crack. Testifying in cases relying on
118. 653 A.2d 1040 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), rev'd, 682 A.2d 248 (Md.
1996).
119. Id. at 1042.
120. See id. at 1043 ("[A] consensual 'check' for drugs could just as reasonably
have been interpreted by the officer to confer permission to go into the pockets.").
121. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
122. Id. at 326; see also Denise Marie Cloutier, Arizona v. Hicks: The Failureto
Recognize Limited Inspections as Reasonable in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 24
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 351, 359 (1991) (arguing that "the plain touch doctrine
and Hicks are theoretically compatible"); Elsie Romero, Fourth Amendment-Requiring
Probable Causefor Searches and Seizures Under the Plain View Doctrine,78 J. CaM.L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 763, 791 (1988) (arguing that Court's establishment of bright-line
rule of probable cause for nonwarrant search and seizures is traditional benchmark for determining reasonable police conduct); David M. Seid, The Aftermath of
Arizona v. Hicks: An Expectation of Privacy at Home, 17 AM. J. C iM. L. 81, 92-93
(1989) ("[A]nyjudicial carve-outs to the [F]ourth [A]mendment [i.e. plain touch]
must contain the same safeguards of individual liberty interests as the warrant
requirement.").

123. See generally United States v. Rogers, No. 95-CR-1136, 1996 WL 422260, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996) (stating that officer is not required to recognize "precise identity" of object, but that there must be "probable cause to believe that the
item is contraband or evidence of a crime"); State v. Curtis, 681 So. 2d 1287, 1292
(La. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "'immediately apparent' in this context means
only that the officer must have probable cause"); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d
849, 856, (Mich. 1996) (stating that "immediately apparent" is equivalent to probable cause standard), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 747 (1997).
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Dickerson, however, officers are generally aware that their testimony
must establish that the object was immediately recognizable when
felt in the authorized manner. Consequently, courts must enforce

the requirement with care.
The "immediately apparent" requirement for seizing an item
that does not feel like a weapon should be distinguished from the
Teny basis for seizing an item that feels like a weapon. A Teny frisk
is justified by the strong interest in protecting the officer. The frisk
is permitted to protect the officer from weapons that may be used

by a detained person whom the officer reasonably believes to be

1 25
armed and dangerous.' 24 Its purpose is to detect any weapons,
giving the officer the opportunity to remove them. The Terry frisk
is therefore biased toward further exploration of objects that feel as
if they could be weapons.' 2 6 Generally, any object of sufficient

124. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officer may stop
and frisk for weapons if "he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual"); People v. Moore, 343 N.Y.S.2d 107, 111-12 (N.Y. 1973)
(holding that officer's reasonable belief that defendant had concealed weapon
provided adequate basis to frisk); State v. Schneider, 389 N.W.2d 604, 605 (N.D.
1986) (holding that officer's awareness of defendant's reputation combined with
circumstances to provide adequate basis to conclude defendant was armed and
dangerous); see also Michael D. Platt, The Limits of Stop and Frisk- Questions Unanswered By Terry, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 435-37 (1968) (suggesting that reasonable
suspicion standard to make Terry stop is too subjective and may result in disproportionate frisks of minority groups).
125. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 853 (stating that scope of pat-down search is
to discover guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments that could be used to
assault officer); State v. Alesso, 328 N.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Minn. 1982) (discussing
scope of frisk); see also Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996)
(stating that officer may search outer clothing to discover weapons).
126. See LAFAvE, supra note 56, § 9.5(b), at 276 (noting that, under Terry, officer may conduct search if he or she reasonably believes object could be dangerous weapon); see also United States v. Quarles, 955 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that officer properly seized "hard lump that might have been a firearm");
Rogers, 1996 WL 422260, at *7 (holding that officer was justified in removing object
that he could not rule out as weapon rather than "playing blind man's [bluff]"
with defendant's coat); People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1371, 1380 (Colo. 1989)
("When a pat-down search provides a police officer with an indication that the
suspect has on his person an object that might be a weapon, the officer has the
right to remove the object.... ."); State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727, 733-34 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (upholding seizure of syringe in frisk mistakenly believed to be
weapon and noting that "law enforcement officers should not be required to expose themselves and the public to the possibility of injury" while they gather further information); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 171 (Ohio 1993) (stating that
"proper question is whether the officer reasonably believed, due to the object's
'size or density,' that it could be a weapon"); Philips v. Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d
918, 920-21 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where pouch large enough to hold
knife or gun contained hard cylindrical object, officer acted accordingly under
Terry in opening pouch and discovering hypodermic needles, spoon with burnt
residue, and "baggie" containing residue); Williams v. Commonwealth, 354 S.E.2d
79, 87 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding seizure because court could not "say as a
matter of law that [the officer] could not have believed the rolled up bills consti-
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hardness and size can be explored, even though its shape does not
advertise it as a gun or knife. 127 If the defendant's clothing obscures the contents from tactile detection, courts often will allow
the officer to investigate the object.' 28 The interest in the officer's
safety tilts the balance toward the government.
In contrast, the plain feel doctrine is not biased to permit exploration of objects that might be evidence.1 29 The Dickerson Court
tuted some sort of weapon"); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1164-65 (Wyo. 1996)
(upholding seizure of hypodermic needles and emphasizing that officer was justified in removing object that could have been weapon).
127. See Carroll v. State, 636 So. 2d 1316, 1318 (Fla. 1994) (holding that officer properly seized keys during pat down because they felt hard and officer
thought they might be weapon); Drake v. State, 655 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.Ct. App.
1995) (holding seizure of roll of money containing drugs was justifiable because
officer had reasonable grounds to believe object could be weapon); State v. Bitterman, 232 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1975) (upholding seizure of prescription bottle
during frisk and stating " [s]ince weapons are not always of an easily discernible
shape, a mockery would be made of the right to frisk if the officers were required
to positively ascertain that a felt object was a weapon prior to removing it"); Evans,
618 N.E.2d at 171-72 (upholding seizure over dissent even though officer acknowledged he knew object was not gun, he was not sure it was not knife and could
reasonably have believed it was weapon); City of Alliance v. Hawkins, No.
1995CA00207, 1997 WL 116915, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1997) (upholding
seizure of small box containing contraband when officer was not sure what hard
object was);James v. Commonwealth, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that officer properly seized hard object that was size of finger, because it was
.not unreasonable" to believe it was weapon-like); Williams, 354 S.E.2d at 87 (holding officer properly seized hard object in defendant's pocket that turned out to be
roll of 11 one hundred dollar bills because officer reasonably believed that it could
be weapon); State v. Elliott, No. 14573-5-Ill, 1997 WL 4504, at *1, 3 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 7, 1997) (officer permitted to search further after feeling "long, thin and
hard" object in defendant's pocket; object could have been leather punch or awl);
see also State v. Flynn, 285 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Wis. 1979) (stating officer properly
removed pliers from defendant during pat down "to determine what it was").
128. See LAFAvE, supra note 56, § 9.5 (c), at 280-81 (noting that officer is often
permitted to reach for object when it is not entirely clear that concealed object is
not weapon); see also State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 524 (Ariz. 1991) (holding
officer's authority to frisk jacket before handing it to defendant extended to feeling in pockets, because jacket's bulk made it difficult to determine contents otherwise); Shinault v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that if
officer finds something that feels like weapon during Terry stop, he or she can
reach inside clothing and check for weapon); State v. Blevins, 920 P.2d 1131, 113335 (Or. Ct. App.) (involving situation in which cylindrical container that held controlled substance was justifiably removed from defendant's jacket pocket to assure
it was not weapon), review allowed by 925 P.2d 908 (Or. 1996); State v. Jackson, 871
P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that officer properly seized bulky
object that might conceal weapon or "article of escape" from defendant's pocket);
State v. Gomez-Sanchez, No. 19665-4-11, 1996 WL 432414, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that officer could pull object out of defendant's pocket and examine it after feeling it was hard and fearing it might be keys or small knife).
129. See Pena v. State, 904 S.W.2d 850, 852-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) ("The law
permits reasonable searches for weapons for the protection of police officers when
they have a reasonable belief that the individual they are dealing with is armed and
dangerous."). In Pena,the officer patted down the defendant's purse for weapons.
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emphasized that the information obtained by feeling the item during the authorized touching must immediately raise probable cause
to believe the object is seizable. 13 0 Mere reasonable suspicion that
an object is contraband does not support any further intrusion. In
this setting, the Fourth Amendment balance lies on the side of the
defendant, whose privacy interests are at risk if the pat down or
other touching is extended beyond the permitted scope. The only
government interest is the general interest in acquiring evidence.
While acquiring evidence is an important interest, it must fall to the
defendant's Fourth Amendment interest. Therefore, only probable
cause to believe the item is evidence or contraband, rendering a
warrant superfluous, justifies its seizure.
When courts do not sufficiently differentiate the two standards,
the less demanding standard for weapon-like objects will seep into
the immediately apparent standard and dilute it in application. If
that occurs, Terry frisks will evolve into searches for evidence. Howard v. State illustrates the hazard of imprecise application. In Howard, the court held that the police had properly seized powder
cocaine in a plastic bag from the defendant's groin area.' 3 ' The

court concluded neither that the officer had probable cause to believe the object was cocaine nor that the officer had reason to believe the object was a weapon.' 32 The officer's testimony provided
an insufficient basis for either type of seizure; indeed the court acknowledged that the officer "never expressly testified whether he
thought the bulge in defendant's pants was a weapon or whether he
thought it was contraband.' 33 Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the evidence "was properly admitted under the Fourth Amendment's 'plain feel' or 'plain touch' exception. '134 Failing to focus
Id. at 852. He felt something inside that was large enough to be a weapon,
although through the purse he could not feel what it was exactly. See id. The
officer opened the purse and found drugs. See id. The court held the officer could
search the purse to resolve uncertainty about whether the purse concealed a
weapon. See id. at 853; see also Liebman, supra note 19, at 202 (arguing that government interest in seizing contraband is insufficient to outweigh protected privacy
interest).
130. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993). The Dickerson Court
stated that "[r]egardless of whether the officer detects the contraband by sight or
by touch . . . the Fourth Amendment require[s] that the officer have probable
cause to believe that the item is contraband before seizing it." Id.
131. Howard v. State, 469 S.E.2d 746, 749 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 748-49. The officer testified that he "knew there was an object
down there that shouldn't be there." Id. at 748.
134. Id.; see People v. Massey, 558 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(O'Connell, J., dissenting) (arguing that seizure of paper bag containing drugs
should be upheld under plain feel by specifically relying on analogy to pat down in
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clearly on the different constitutional standards for Terry and plain
feel, the court approved a violation of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights.
1.

CasualEvaluation of Prosecution Claims

1 35
As the Washington Supreme Court noted in State v. Hudson,
"it is the trial court which must make the determination whether
the nature of the particular object at issue is such that there can be
a credible claim of recognition by touch."1 36 Aware that officers
know the requirements of plain feel and have a strong incentive to
mold their testimony accordingly, courts should weigh this testimony carefully. Courts must not accept uncritically the assertion
that an object's nature was "immediately apparent" to the officer
who felt it. Instead, each court must draw on all the evidence
presented as well as the court's own common sense to determine
whether the government has established its claim of immediate
recognition.
In some instances, courts defer to governmental plain touch
claims even though the testimony that the object's nature was immediately apparent seems incredible. When courts engage in deferential fact finding, Dickerson becomes a license to seize any item of
interest large enough to create a palpable bulge. Unfortunately,
some courts have been willing to accept the officer's claim at face
value and conclude that the object's nature was immediately apparent. In State v. Wonders,137 the appellate court set out the trial
court's explanation of its ruling:

In order for the Court to grant the motion to suppress, I
would have to find that the testimony of the officer lacked
credibility when he stated that it was immediately apparent to him when he was patting down the defendant that
the bulge in his front pocket was a baggie of marijuana. I
would likewise have to discredit his testimony that a baggie
of marijuana in this situation has a "consistent feel."
which officer feels and removes gun). The dissent in Massey failed to distinguish
between detection of weapons and detection of other types of evidence and criticized the majority for applying an "immediately apparent" standard that would

require suppression of gun. Id. (O'Connell, J., dissenting).
135. 874 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1994).
136. Id. at 167.
137. 929 P.2d 792 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
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Given the training and experience of the officer, the
138
Court cannot do this.
Other trial courts may share this court's reluctance to discredit
police testimony. 139 Two Indiana cases illustrate the risk that both
trial and appellate courts will defer uncritically to the police officers. In Bratcher v. State,140 the court upheld a seizure on the basis
of the testimonial claim from the officer who conducted the pat
down that he felt a "soft item" and "right away... figured it was a
bag containing marijuana." 14 1 Similarly, in Walker v. State,142 the
court upheld a plain feel seizure on the basis of the officer's testimony that, "I felt the object in his pocket was consistent to what I've
felt many times before to be marijuana ...

I believed it to be mari-

juana when I felt it the first time.' 43 In each of these cases, the
authority to stop the defendant was unrelated to drug activity and
nothing else in the circumstances supported an expectation that
the defendant would have drugs. Therefore, the seizure rested exclusively on the information gathered through the pat-down touch.
In each case, the marijuana was in a plastic bag and not a distinctive
form of packaging. In neither case did the officer describe any tactile characteristics that permitted him to identify the drugs, Instead, the conclusion that the felt object was a container of
marijuana may have been based on a hunch or prejudice rather
138. Id. at 798. Interestingly, the trial court failed to address several of the
other surrounding circumstances. See id. For example, the appellate court points
out that the trial court disregarded the officer's testimony that "he was searching
for weapons as well as drugs and paraphernalia." Id. Additionally, the trial court
ignored the fact that the officer initiated a second search after determining that
the defendant was unarmed. See id.
139. See State v. Mitchell, 692 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, which rested on officer's
testimony that felt item was "possibly contraband" despite concession that it could

have been aspirin or candy). But see Jones v. State, 682 A.2d 248, 251-52 (Md.
1996) (quoting trial court's explanation of its ruling in favor of defendant). In
Jones, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
Officer Ottey testified, and I'm quoting, he immediately recognized [the

bulge] to be crack cocaine .... Now, the problem is, and the Officer
testified as an expert, and I accept him as an expert, but ... it's not just a
question of being an expert and coming in and saying the magic words
like it was readily apparent would be the words from the Supreme Court
....
I have to make my determination as to whether I'm going to accept
the expert's opinion based upon the facts upon which his opinion was
based. And there are insufficient facts for me to accept that opinion [in]

the record.
Id. at 252.
140. 661 N.E.2d 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

141. Id. at 832.
142. 661 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
143. Id. at 871.
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than perceived facts supporting relevant inferences. By demanding
nothing more than conclusory assertions, the courts abdicated their
144
responsibility to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
Drug cases frequently present the temptation to apply a relaxed version of plain feel. Officers suspecting drug activity often
employ pat downs not only to discover weapons, but also to discover
contraband. The prosecution then advances plain feel to justify the
seizure. Too often, the courts fail to enforce the immediately apparent requirement of Dickerson. In State v. Hunter, 45 for example,
the police observed the defendant and another man in "a location
known for high drug activity." 146 On a hunch, the police approached the two men. 147 Observing this, the other man placed a
small "wadded up" plastic bag inside defendant's coat. 1 48 Upon
stopping the defendant and frisking him for weapons, the officer
felt an object that he concluded was the wadded up bag and seized
it; it contained crack cocaine.' 49 The court held that:
[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, .. . it was immediately apparent to the officer (1) that the small package
he felt inside appellant's coat was the wadded up plastic
bag the officers had witnessed the other man.place inside
appellant's coat, and (2) that the incriminating nature of
the wadded up plastic bag was immediately apparent to
50
the officer.'
Assuming the stop and frisk were valid, the police nevertheless did
not have probable cause to seize the bag.' 5 ' The tactile informa144. See also State v. Jackson, 684 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding seizure of cocaine). In Jackson, the court upheld the officer's seizure of 19
pieces of plastic containing cocaine. See id. The officer frisked the defendant because a reliable informant had reported that the defendant had a weapon. See id.
Although he found no weapon, the officer felt a "golf-ball shaped object in the
defendant's pocket." Id. Based on the "size, shape, and texture of the object and
the nervous behavior of the defendant," the officer was led to believe it was contraband. Id. Nothing in the circumstances or the palpable characteristics of the
drugs supports a claim that the officer had probable cause to believe the object was
cocaine.

145. 649 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
146. Id. at 291.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 292.
151. See id. (arguing that police officers conduct offends fundamental values
of Fourth Amendment) (Blackmon, J., dissenting). The dissenting justice argued
that the stop and frisk were not valid, criticizing the entire procedure as an unjustified pretextual intrusion searching for drugs. See id. (Blackmon, J., dissenting).
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tion gathered in the course of the frisk amounted to nothing more
than confirmation of what the police had observed visually: that the
defendant had a plastic bag in his pocket. The frisk garnered the
police no additional information about the nature of the bag and
its contents. 152 If the presence of the bag in defendant's pocket
gave rise to probable cause to believe the bag was contraband, then,
even before they frisked, the police had probable cause to believe
the defendant was in possession of contraband and could have arrested him. Obviously, that proposition is so preposterous that it
was not advanced to support the intrusion in the case. The officers'
observations, both visual and tactile, established reasonable suspicion and nothing more. Failing to acquire probable cause, the police were required to end the contact with the defendant. By
seemingly equating "immediately apparent" with reasonable suspicion, the court invoked plain feel to uphold an unconstitutional
seizure of evidence.
The decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Dickerson v.
State 53 also demonstrates unexacting application of plain feel. The
court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Dickerson to uphold the seizure of drugs during a frisk. 154 The officers in
Dickerson v. State had more information than those in Hunter. They
had observed the defendant in his car on the wrong side of the
street, with a man leaning against the car. 155 When the man walked
away, he informed the officers that the defendant had tried to sell
him cocaine. 15 6 When an officer then approached the car, the defendant rolled up the windows and locked the door. 157 When he
eventually emerged from the car, the defendant made repeated attempts to put his hand in his left coat pocket.1 58 Patting down the
152. See State v. Velez, No. 67595, 1995 WL 264544, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May
4, 1995) (upholding seizure where officer observed exchange and, during pat
down, felt "small rock like substance" in defendant's pocket).
153. 909 S.W.2d 653 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995).
154. See id. at 656. The court stated:
[W]e find no error in the officer's seizure of the cocaine. The United
States Supreme Court held in Minnesota v. Dickerson that police officers
may seize nonthreatening contraband during a protective pat down

search ....
Here, the officers were justified in stopping and frisking the appellant .... [I] t was apparent to [the officer] that what he felt ... was a bag
of cocaine. Thus, the seizure did not invade the appellant's privacy.
Id.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See
See
See
See

id. at 655.
id.
id.
id.
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defendant, the officer felt a large bulge in that pocket and seized a
159
plastic bag of cocaine.

The combination of the observed facts and the other man's
report may have given the police probable cause to believe the defendant was engaged in drug distribution. The court did not, however, assess whether they had probable cause. Instead, the court
held that the officer's claim that "it was apparent to him that what
he felt in the appellant's pocket was a bag of cocaine" established
adequate basis for the seizure. 160 The case was a poor one for plain
feel. The tactile information garnered in the pat down added little
to the officers' knowledge; if the other information did not constitute probable cause, the fact that the defendant had a lumpy object
in his pocket would not tip the balance. By treating the case as a
plain feel seizure rather than a search incident to arrest, the court
invited future application of the plain feel doctrine to uphold
seizures even though the felt object possesses no identifying
features.
2.

A Healthy Skepticism

One criticism of the plain feel doctrine is that tactile information is too uncertain to provide probable cause.16 ' In Dickerson, the
Court declined to reject tactile information categorically. 16 2 Nevertheless, awareness of the inherent uncertainty of tactile data must
inform the application of the plain feel doctrine. The courts must
ensure that the doctrine only benefits the prosecution when the
vagueness of tactile information has somehow been overcome.
As discussed above, an officer who acquires probable cause to
believe a defendant is carrying contraband has probable cause to
arrest. Tellingly, however, the government invokes plain feel only
when the officer (who now claims to have immediately recognized
the contraband by its distinctive feel) did not arrest, but investigated further. If the officer acted on the claimed immediate recognition and arrested the defendant, the case would raise an issue of
probable cause to arrest, but not plain feel seizure. 163 Instead, in
159. See id.
160. Id. at 656.
161. See Miller, supra note 46, at 256 (discussing question of whether tactile
information is sufficiently reliable to support probable cause).

162. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (applying plain
view doctrine "by analogy to cases in which an officer discovers contraband
through the sense of touch during an otherwise lawful search").
163. The prosecution could also seek to justify the search prior to arrest as a

search incident to arrest. That argument, however, rarely appears. One could infer that the prosecution sees the "immediately apparent" plain feel standard as
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the plain feel cases, the officer did not arrest, but reached into the
place where the object lay concealed from sight and removed the
object. This course of action almost compels the conclusion that
the officer did not believe he or she had probable cause that the
felt object was contraband. Instead, it suggests that the officer felt
the need to explore further, seeking visual confirmation of suspicion (but not probable cause) fueled by the tactile information.
Although the officer's subjective belief is not critical to the determination of probable cause, the pattern in these cases raises concern
about the truthfulness of the later claim that the evidence was immediately recognizable from its tactile characteristics.
Viewing the relationship between plain feel and search incident to arrest, the courts should assess probable cause to seize with
care. The courts should reject plain feel arguments unless convinced that the tactile information gave the officer probable cause
to arrest. When the information suggesting that the defendant is
committing or has committed a crime is sufficiently strong, the police may have probable cause to arrest the defendant either without
gathering any additional information through plain feel or despite
gathering only minimal information as a result of a permitted
touching. 164 When tactile information is the principal basis for
claiming probable cause, however, the court should adopt a skeptical attitude and rigorously enforce the standard of probable cause.
Dickerson provides a model of healthy skepticism. As noted by
the Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the record
closely and concluded that "the officer's own testimony 'belies any
notion that he "immediately" recognized the lump as crack cocaine.' "165 The Minnesota court recognized that the officer continued to probe the contents of the pocket after he had determined
easier to meet than the probable cause standard for arrest. For a further discussion of the justification of a search incident to arrest, see supra notes 31-44 and
accompanying text.
164. See State v. Bridges, No. 02C01-9412-CC-00298, 1995 WL 764998, at *5

(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 1995) (finding that officer had probable cause based
on information received before pat-down search and tactile recognition of pill bottle); see also Parker v. State, 662 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
informant's tip and officer's experience in high drug areas established probable
cause for pat down that led to seizure of cocaine).
165. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)); see also State
v. Dickerson, 481 N.W. 2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992) (holding that officer was not
privileged to continue manipultating object after discovering it could not possibly
be weapon), rev'd, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). In declining to recognize a plain feel
doctrine, the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that the sense of touch is less
immediate and reliable than the sense of sight, and the sense of touch is more
intrusive into an individual's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See id. at 845.
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the pocket did not contain a weapon. 166 Some courts have followed
the example and have approached officers' claims skeptically. For
example, in Jordan v. State,167 the appellate court concluded that
the prosecution had not established a sufficient factual basis for
plain feel. 168 Although the officer testified that he felt a "hard
rocky-like substance" in defendant's pocket, his experience provided no basis for his conclusion that it was crack cocaine. 169 Similarly, in People v. Blake, the court rejected the state's plain feel
argument because "there was no explanation of how a tightly rolled
mass could distinctively feel like marijuana to the exclusion of other
legitimate substances."' 7 0 In State v. Tzintzun-Jimenez,1 71 the court
held that the officer who merely felt a "slippery material" did not
have probable cause to believe there was a baggie of cocaine in the
defendant's pocket. 17 2 In each of these three cases, the trial court
had held the testimony sufficient and admitted the seized evidence. 173 Only the appellate courts' careful application of the constitutional standards vindicated the defendants' Fourth
174
Amendment rights.
166. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378 (discussing Minnesota Supreme Court's
analysis of police officer's conduct). In its opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court
noted that the officer determined that the object was contraband only after
"squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's
pocket." Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 844.
167. 664 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
168. Id. at 273 (reversing judgment because "the trial court heard no testimony from the state to support its reliance upon the 'plain feel' doctrine").
169. Id. at 273-74. The court found that the officer never offered testimony
that he had seen crack cocaine before or that he could detect it based on his tactile
experience. See id. at 274. Therefore, the court held that the defendant's motion
to suppress should have been granted based on the lack of testimony to support
the officer's ability to identify the crack cocaine before he removed it from the
defendant's pocket. See id.
170. People v. Blake, 645 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). The officer's
lack of experience and the unsuspicious nature of the area also led the court to
find that no probable cause existed. See id.
171. 866 P.2d 667 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
172. Id. at 668.
173. See Jordan, 664 So. 2d at 273 ("The trial court found that the officer had
probable cause to put his hand inside Jordan's pocket based upon the plain feel
doctrine."); Blake, 645 N.E.2d at 582 ("[T]he [trial] court found that the pat down
of the bulge in defendant's pocket gave Officer Cimaglio probable cause to believe
that defendant possessed contraband."); Trintzun-Jimenez, 866 P.2d at 668 (noting
that trial court had allowed evidence "based in part on its conclusion that 'Officer
Demarest was not required to ignore his experience when he felt the slippery material in the [defendant's] pocket'").
174. See Commonwealth v. Mesa, 683 A.2d 643, 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(holding that officer's testimony did not support trial court's ruling that marijuana
found in roll of money was immediately recognizable as contraband and remarking, in part, "it is difficult for us to perceive how a large amount of currency,
in and of itself, and sight unseen, could have a 'contour or mass' that was immedi-
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Unfortunately, not all courts approach plain feel with such caution. Many are deferential to prosecution claims, even when those
claims appear patently incredible. Cases involving crack cocaine illustrate the challenge of assessing plain feel arguments as well as
judicial approaches to that challenge. Plain feel cases involve crack
cocaine more than any other type of evidence; and, courts generally
defer to law enforcement claims that crack is immediately recognizable to the touch, even when wrapped in plastic and masked by a
layer of clothing.
Descriptions of crack cocaine's tactile characteristics, however,
suggest that this deference is not warranted. Crack cocaine appears
in many different shapes and consistencies. One witness presented
a detailed description of the physical properties of various quantities of crack: "Gram-sized powder bindles and chunks of rock cocaine are the smaller units. 1/16 oz. and 1/8 oz. is a powder with
flakes and 1/2 oz. is powdery with chunks. An ounce size is a chunk
that flakes distinctively when pressed. A kilo is hard and
75
compressed."
The variety of descriptive terms applied to the tactile characteristics of crack suggests that it is less recognizable than often claimed
in court. For example, witnesses have variously testified that an object was immediately identifiable as crack cocaine because it felt
"small and rock like" 176 or "very large like a golf ball object. 1 77 In
one case, an officer felt what he described as "the distinctive feel of
ately recognizable as a controlled substance"). The court found that the cash itself
was not contraband and that the marijuana was identifiable only after removed
from the defendant's pockets. See id.
175. State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994). In Hudson, the Washington Supreme Court remanded the case to the appellate court for a determination of whether the officer immediately recognized the object as contraband or if
it was recognizable only after manipulation. Id.
176. People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ill. 1995) (describing crack as
feeling "like a piece of rock"); State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.
1992) (finding that lump of crack cocaine was no bigger than marble), rev'd, 508
U.S. 366 (1993); State v. Velez, No. 67595, 1995 WL 264544, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
May 4, 1995) (describing crack as "small rock like substance"); State v. Jerry Co.,
No. 96-2232, 1997 WL 3329, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1997) (noting that officer
described contraband as "little rocks" or "stones"); see also Mitchell v. Commonwealth, No. 1775-94-2, 1995 WL 452339, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1995) (describing cocaine found in defendant's pocket as "a small, irregularly shaped object").
177. State v. Johnson, 660 So. 2d 942, 945 (La. Ct. App 1995) (describing
crack as "large rock-like object"); State v. Brown, No. 15300, 1996 WL 74698, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996) (explaining that crack cocaine seized from defendant
felt like "large, hard rocky lump"); State v. Stroud, No. 14832, 1995 WL 600004, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1995) (analogizing crack cocaine seized from defendant to "large golf ball sized object"); see also Commonwealth v. Lopez, No. 9577CR3107, 1996 WL 339948, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 21, 1996) (describing crack as
feeling "like ping-pong balls").
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a cookie of crack cocaine."1

78

In another, the officer testified that

179
the package had a "peanut brittle type feeling."
Rather than acceding to law enforcement claims of expertise in
tactile drug recognition, courts should approach the testimony
skeptically. In State v. Hudson,180 for example, the trial and appellate courts held the seizure of crack invalid because the officer's
description of what he felt did not correspond with his description
of crack cocaine. 181 Similarly, in Jones v. State, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress and, although the intermediate appellate court reversed, the Maryland Court of Appeals
reinstated the trial court's ruling. 18 2 In Jones, the trial court explained its ruling as follows:

Officer Ottey testified, and I'm quoting, he immediately recognized [the bulge] to be crack cocaine.... Now,
the problem is, and the Officer testified as an expert, and
I accept him as an expert, but.., it's not just a question of
being an expert and coming in and saying the magic
words like it was readily apparent would be the words from
the Supreme Court ....I have to make my determination
as to whether I'm going to accept the expert's opinion
based upon the facts upon which his opinion was based.
And there are insufficient facts for me to accept that opin183
ion [in] the record.
The trial court in State v. Woods,' 8 4 was similarly skeptical, commenting that:
178. Andrews v. State, 471 S.E.2d 567, 568 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
179. Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1992). The court utilized a

totality of the circumstances approach in determining whether the officer had
probable cause to seize the contraband. See id. at 445. Under this approach, the
court considered the fact that the officer had previously discovered hidden cocaine on 70 different occasions. See id.
180. 848 P.2d 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 874 P.2d 160 (Wash. 1994).
181. Id. at 220. In discussing the officer's testimony, the court noted:
The officer did not testify that what he felt had small porous holes, flaked
apart when he touched it or that it felt soapy. The officer stated that the
substance in the baggie "crumbl[ed] a little bit." Crumbling is inconsistent with the officer's testimony that material will flake, rather than powder, off a chunk of cocaine.
Id.
182. Jones v. State, 682 A.2d 248, 250 (Md. 1996).
183. Id. at 251-52. The trial judge found there was insufficient evidence as to
the extent of the officer's training, experience and tactile knowledge to determine
whether it would be readily apparent to the officer that the defendant's pocket
contained crack cocaine. See id. at 252.
184. 680 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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[I] t is simply not objectively reasonable to conclude that a
quick pat-down of the defendant's waistband for weapons
permitted the officer to feel with his palm an object measurable only in tenths of a gram which he readily determined to be crack cocaine in the change pocket of the
1
defendant's jeans.

3.

5

The Importance of Context

When gathered in a suggestive context, even limited tactile information may be sufficient to raise the totality of information to
probable cause. In some cases, the government has information in
addition to that provided by the tactile exploration. To reinforce
the limits on the plain feel doctrine, courts should clearly identify
the role of nontactile information in establishing probable cause to
seize. In doing so, courts should differentiate between information
specific to the defendant, which may support a determination of
probable cause, and general information, which may heighten police suspicion, but contributes little to probable cause.
In many cases, the context in which the officer interprets tactile sensations supports a claim that the nature of the object was

immediately apparent.1 8 6 Cases in which the police seize a
container of drugs illustrate the importance of context to the determination of probable cause. Even visual inspection of a container
may not give the police probable cause to seize it. They will acquire
probable cause on the basis of appearance alone only if the
container is transparent or has unusual characteristics, such as tape
or markings. If, however, the container is opaque and does not
have characteristics that advertise illicit use, visual inspection alone
will not establish a basis on which to seize the container. 18 7 Tactile
185. Id. at 731.
186. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014,1016 (Ill. 1995) (upholding
seizure when officer with extensive experience observed crack pipes and other paraphernalia and felt something "like a piece of rock inside a small baggie" in defendant's shirt pocket); Parker v. State, 662 N.E.2d 994, 999 (Ind.Ct. App. 1996)
(holding seizure of cocaine reasonable when informant's tip and officer's knowledge of area allowed officer to conclude that hard object he felt was cocaine);
State v. Velez, No. 67595, 1995 WL 264544, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 1995) (holding that officer who witnessed defendant exchange object for money with known
drug dealer and place object in his pocket was justified in concluding that rock-like
object was crack cocaine).
187. See State v. Vasquez, 815 P.2d 659, 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding
that diaper bag containing marijuana had no distinctive characteristics that could
allow officer to identify it as drug paraphernalia through visual inspection). The
court found that the unusual location of the bag was insufficient to establish probable cause. See id.
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exploration, the basis for plain feel arguments, always yield limited
information, and courts usually recognize that feeling the contour
of a container is insufficient to raise probable cause to believe it
conceals contraband. The courts, therefore, generally reject the argument that an officer can identify a container by its tactile characteristics and seize it because it is commonly used to hold drugs.1 88
In United States v. Ross,189 for example, a law enforcement officer
seized a matchbox of cocaine from defendant's underwear. 190 The
district court granted the motion to suppress because the officer,
feeling only the box and not the contents, may have been suspicious, but did not have probable cause to seize. 191
United States v. Ross, 827 F. Supp. 711, 720 (S.D. Ala. 1993)
188. See, e.g.,
(granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained when officer seized
matchbox containing cocaine from defendant during pat down); Howard v. State,
645 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that officer violated defendant's rights when he seized and shook film canister during consensual weapons pat
down); Commonwealth v. Stackfield, 651 A.2d 558, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (rejecting argument that officer could recognize contraband simply by feeling plastic
baggies in defendant's pocket); State v. White, No. 03C01-9408-CR-00277, 1995 WL
336977, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 7, 1995) (holding that officer did not have
probable cause to believe film canister in defendant's crotch area was contraband,
even though informant had provided some information suggesting that defendant
was dealing drugs); Campbell v. State, 864 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. App. 1993) (finding seizure of canister of cocaine unconstitutional because it did not feel like
weapon and incriminating character was not immediately apparent); State v. Johnson, 522 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (suppressing marijuana found in
film canister and remarking that "[a]lthough the canister itself was in plain view,
its contents were not"); see also State v. Abrams, 471 S.E.2d 716, 718 (S.C. Ct. App.
1996) (suppressing fruits of seizure of Tylenol bottle containing crack that felt like
"shotgun shell or an instrument used to transport contraband"); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, No. 0298-96-1, 1996 WL 343971, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. June 25, 1996) (remarking that officer conducting consent search for weapons "did not have authority or consent to remove the object that he felt in the defendant's groin area," but
that he "would have been justified in questioning the defendant" about object because he was aware of common practice of packaging cocaine in pill bottles). But
see Allen v. State, 689 So. 2d 212, 216 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that officer
could recognize evidence as contraband and seize small manila envelope of marijuana); State v. Vandiver, 891 P.2d 350, 353 (Kan. 1995) (holding seizure not justified when officer candidly reported that he "removed the canister from [the
defendant's] pocket 'to inspect it, not knowing what it was"').
189. 827 F. Supp. 711 (S.D. Ala. 1993).
190. Id. at 713-15 (describing police officer's pat down of defendant and
seizure of matchbox).
191. See id. at 719-20. Although the defendant was approached in the parking
lot of a motel where the police were investigating drug trafficking, the police had
no evidence linking him to drug activity. See id. at 712-13. Therefore, the court's
suggestion that the officer could have arrested the defendant is not well founded.
See id. at 719 n.17 (suggesting that police officer should have arrested or detained
defendant for suspected possession of cocaine). In Commonwealth v. White, 685
A.2d 567, 570 (Pa. Super. 1996), however, the court concluded that the seizure of
an opaque film cannister was permissible under the plain view doctrine. Id. The
court categorized the canister as "closely akin to those rare single purpose containers which 'by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of pri-
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The context, however, can provide additional facts, which,
taken with the tactile information, establish probable cause. In People v. Champion,192 the court considered the admissibility of a pill
bottle seized from the defendant's groin area during a pat-down
search. 19 3 Only the contextual facts supplied probable cause to believe the pill bottle was seizable.1 94 The intermediate appellate
court disregarded the context and concluded the evidence must be
excluded, reasoning that it was "impossible to conclude that the
incriminating nature of a pill bottle is immediately apparent" and
that visual inspection of the bottle was an additional intrusion prohibited by Dickerson.195 Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed, emphasizing the context of the seizure in concluding it
was proper.1 96 The court noted a number of factors, including
awareness of the defendant's prior drug arrests and the defendant's
failure to comply with police orders to remove his hands from his
sweatpants. 197 Combined with the tactile identification of the pill
bottle, these factors established probable cause to believe the bottle
198
contained contraband.

vacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance."' Id.
(quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979)). Although the
seizure upheld in Whitewas arguably justified because of the context, the assertion
that film canisters are so identified with drug storage that they are routinely seizable is fatuous. To accept the assertion, one would have to accept the proposition
that any person seen with a film cannister would be arrestable because the police
would have probable cause to believe the cannister contained drugs. There is no
reason to believe that the White court would have pushed its assertion that far, and
that the facts of the case, which included a tip concerning drug dealing, arguably
supported a determination of probable cause.
192. 549 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997).
193. Id. at 851-52.
194. See id. at 859-60 ("It is only under the totality of the circumstances before
us ... that we find that removal of this particular pill bottle was authorized.").
195. See People v. Champion, 518 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994),
rev'd, 549 N.W.2d 849 (Mich. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747 (1997). The
appellate court found that the officer's visual inspection of the pill bottle in Champion was much like the officer's manipulation of the drugs in Dickersonand, therefore, exceeded the plain feel doctrine. See id.
196. See Champion, 549 N.W.2d at 859 (applying totality of circumstances approach, which included defendant's furtive bahavior, his refusal to remove his
hands from his pockets and officer's knowledge of defendant's past drug
involvement).
197. See id.
198. See id. at 859-60. The court cautioned that its decision was based solely
on the specific facts of the case and an in-depth examination of the facts. See id. at
859.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/1

42

Poulin: The Plain Feel Doctrine and the Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
1997]

PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE

783

Similarly, in State v. Rushing 99 and State v. Bridges,20 0 the courts
upheld seizures because the context supplied other information essential to probable cause. 20 1 In Rushing, the court cited several fac-

tors supporting the plain feel seizure of a medicine bottle: "1) the
officer's feel of the object, 2) his knowledge of the suspicious transaction observed by [another officer], 3) the reputation of the

neighborhood as a drug trafficking area, and 4) his knowledge of
commonly used drug containers."' 20 2 : In Bridges, a reliable confidential informant had told the officer that the defendant was in a particular location selling drugs and had drugs on him. 203 When the
officer found the defendant in the predicted location and felt a pill
bottle, which he knew was commonly used for drugs, in the defend20 4
ant's pocket, he had probable cause to seize the bottle.
The unusual location of an object may help bolster a claim that
it was immediately recognizable as contraband. If a defendant has a
bulky object inside his or her crotch area, or has bulges around his
or her ankles, the police are justified in believing the object is concealed contraband.2 0 5 While the location of the bulge alone may
199. 935 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1713 (1997).
200. No. 02C01-9412-CC-00298, 1995 WL 764998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28,
1995).
201. See Rushing, 935 S.W.2d at 33 (upholding seizure of cocaine based upon
distinctive characteristics of container in which it was contained); Bridges, 1995 WL
764998, at *6 (concluding that officer had probable cause to seize pill bottle from
defendant's jacket based on totality of circumstances).
202. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d at 33; see also State v. Hawkins, No. 95-CA-55, 1996
WL 488830, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 22, 1996) (listing factors contributing to
officer's plain feel seizure of bottle, which did not contain drugs, but resulted in
discovery of drugs in same pocket).
203. See Bridges, 1995 WL 764998, at *1. Several years before, the informant
had provided the officer with information that eventually led to an arrest and conviction. See id. In commenting upon the informant's reliability, the officer stated
that "[he] had always been very straightforward and very honest and very reliable
with me and has given me information in the past." Id. The officer also testified
that prior to the defendant's arrest, he had received "a lot of information on [the
defendant] .

.

. relating to drugs" from undisclosed sources. Id.

204. See id. at *5; see also People v. Limon, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 404 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding that officer who found hide-a-key box in defendant's pocket had
probable cause to arrest in light of defendant's suspicious conduct and container's
distinctive character).
205. See United States v. Craft, 30 F.3d 1044, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing
situation in which defendant had packages of heroin and cocaine taped to his
ankles and holding that contraband was immediately apparent to officer); Doctor
v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1992) (describing discovery of eight-inch long
bag of rock cocaine); People v. Champion, 549 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Mich. 1996)
(involving pill bottle of cocaine found in crotch area), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 747
(1997); State v. Stroud, No. 14832, 1995 WL 600004, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11,
1995) (finding large rock of crack inside defendant's pants between waistband and
crotch); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 631 A.2d 1335, 1337 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(seizing package of cocaine hidden in defendant's crotch area); State v. Jerry Co.,
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not provide probable cause to seize an item, only slight additional
information may be necessary to establish probable cause. In United
States v. Craft,20 6 for example, the officer who conducted the consensual pat down of the defendant had seven years of experience
detecting drugs at the airport and was therefore familiar with this
technique of packaging drugs for transportation. 20 7 Similarly, in
People v. Dibb,20 8 the police garnered probable cause through plain
touch when, after observing that defendant had a scale that smelled
of methamphetamine, two beepers and a plastic bag, the officer felt
an object that was "lumpy" and "had volume and mass" on defendant's leg between his knee and calf.20 9 The unusual location and

tactile characteristics of the object together with other evidence
suggesting drug dealing established probable cause to believe the
2 10
felt object was contraband.
On the other hand, courts must not overplay the role of context. Courts should realize that context sometimes heightens law
enforcement's suspicion without making a commensurate contribution to probable cause. In the dark, during the Halloween season,
peeled grapes feel like eyeballs and a bowl of spaghetti feels like
intestines. The child feeling these innocuous products is predisposed to believe they are frightening or gruesome, so the child's
2
sense of touch convinces him or her that they are body parts. 11
Similarly, on the street in a high-crime neighborhood or in the
clothing of the wrong person, any soft bulge might feel like illegal
drugs to a police officer. The object has no peculiar and palpable
characteristics, but the officer feeling it is predisposed to believe it
No. 96-2232, 1997 WL 3329, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1997) (quoting juvenile
court ruling that "if... a police officer observe [s] . . . a drug transaction and...

then find[s] a package in the person who you suspect to be the dealer's underyou've gone beyond suspicion
wear, it doesn't matter how big the package is ....
and have reached the level of probable cause"). But see State v. Burton, 556
N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (stressing officer's vague "feel" testimony

and failing to emphasize fact that cocaine was found concealed in ankle area).
206. 30 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 1994).
207. Id. at 1045 (noting that officer was familiar with drug couriers taping
drugs to their bodies).

208. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 823 (Ct. App. 1995).
209. See id. at 824 (holding that "plain feel" exception was not available to
officer because object was not immediately apparent as contraband, but finding
that other factors established probable cause). The court believed that the surrounding circumstances made it immediately apparent to the officers that what
they felt was contraband. See id. at 826.
210. See id. (reasoning that police could arrest defendant and search him incident to arrest).
211. See also Miller, supra note 46, at 250-56 (discussing strengths of various
human senses).
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is contraband. This predisposition shines through in a number of
cases and, unfortunately, courts sometimes indulge it.
Instead, a court assessing a plain touch argument should cautiously weigh factors that simply increase police curiosity and insist
that the testifying officer recount the specific tactile sensations that
made the nature of the object immediately apparent as contraband.
For example, mere presence in a high-crime or known drug-trafficking neighborhood should receive little weight. 2 12 In State v.
Jones, the dissenting justice criticized the majority for ascribing undue weight to the fact that the defendant was stopped in an "openair drug market."2 1 3 Other than his presence in that setting, the

police had no specific reason to suspect the defendant of drug involvement. 214 Nevertheless, the setting both prompted the officer
to seek consent to frisk and, receiving consent, predisposed him to
conclude that the felt objects were drugs.2 1 5 Indeed, in State v. Dickerson,21 6 the defendant had just left what the police described as a
crack house. 217 Yet, without more information, the police officer
was not justified in assuming that the lump in the defendant's
pocket was contraband.
General factors, such as the neighborhood, contribute to reasonable suspicion, but should not act as substitutes for probable
cause. The courts can stop the erosion of Fourth Amendment protection against intrusive tactile exploration and unjustified seizures
only by enforcing assiduously the immediately apparent requirement. Each court must demand specific facts that establish probable cause to believe the particular item is contraband rather than
accepting conclusory assertions or according weight to general cir212. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 645 So. 2d 156, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting state's argument that police had probable cause to seize film canister in
part because defendant was in high-crime area).
213. State v.Jones, 653 A.2d 1040, 1075 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (Bloom,J.,
dissenting) (reminding majority that "open-air drug market" is also corner in residential neighborhood and that, therefore, defendant is likely to be law-abiding
resident), rev'd, 682 A.2d 248 (Md. 1996).
214. See id. (Bloom, J. dissenting). Interestingly, in Jones, the officer tried to
have it both ways, testifying both that "being in an open-air drug market did add to

[the] conclusion" that the object was crack cocaine and that if he received consent
to frisk and felt a similar object in his pocket he would have concluded it was crack
cocaine. SeeJones v. State, 682 A.2d 248, 251 (Md. 1996).
215. See Jones, 682 A.2d at 251. The officer testified that location was not a
critical factor in the determination that the object was crack cocaine. See id.
216. 481 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn. 1992), rev'd, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
217. See id. (describing building defendant had exited as "a 24-hour-a-day
crack house" and noting that officer had previously found drugs there).
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cumstances that make the officers suspicious, but do not specifically
21 8
address the felt object.

VI.

A

MODEL FOR JUDICIAL EVALUATION OF PLAIN FEEL

Courts should take three steps to check the credibility of the
claim that the nature of the evidence was immediately apparent.
First, the court should examine the physical evidence. 2 19 In some
cases, that evidence contradicts the claim that the nature of the object was immediately apparent. 22 0 For example, in United States v.
Mitchell,22 1 the court rejected the assertions of two experienced of-

ficers that the crack cocaine offered against the defendant was immediately apparent in the course of a pat down for weapons. 222
The court noted that "examination of the evidence had assisted the
resolution" of the issue and concluded that the officer could not
have recognized crack cocaine as immediately apparent when the
cocaine was simultaneously insulated by layers consisting of plastic
bags, a sock, a paper bag and the defendant's heavy leather
jacket. 223 Although Mitchell represents an extreme example of a
claim that is implausible in light of the physical evidence, careful
evaluation by the court may uncover similar exaggerated claims of
2 24
tactile identification.

Second, the court should ask what the tactile information
would convey to an unbiased observer, rather than deferring to the
218. See, e.g., State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Wis. 1992) (upholding
seizure because officer testified that soft bulge "[flelt like it was drugs. It felt like a
bag of-of possibly cocaine or marijuana").
219. See People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1022 (Ill. 1995) (noting "that
tactile evidence can be preserved for trial to assure courts of an opportunity to
evaluate the object the officer claims justified the seizure"); see also Commonwealth
v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (observing seized contraband
and noting "the minute amount of drugs ... could not have been identified
through sense of touch").
220. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Crowder, 884 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Ky. 1994) (involving small piece of crack cocaine in corner of plastic bag in coat pocket); State
v. Woods, 680 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (involving "pebble" of
cocaine).
221. 832 F. Supp. 1073 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
222. Id. at 1079 (noting that officers identified object "by feeling through a
layer of leather, lining, paper, cloth material, and plastic").
223. Id. Given the fact that the cocaine was insulated by layers, the court
found it difficult to believe that it would be possible to identify the contraband
"with a single pass of one's hand over the outer clothing." Id.
224. See Woods, 680 N.E.2d at 732 (deferring to trial court's determination
because trial court "had the benefit of viewing the 'pebble' retrieved from the
appellee's pocket and could determine whether it was reasonable to believe that
Officer Daley could have concluded that the pebble was probably crack cocaine
from feeling it with the palm of his hand").
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perspective of a police officer interested in locating contraband.
Quite often, the tactile evidence does not definitively signal contraband and may be consistent with items other than contraband.
Candy, hardware and jewelry, for example, may all feel "small and
rock like" or even "like a golf ball object." In Commonwealth v. Marconi, the court recognized the ambiguity of tactile data. The court
rejected the prosecution's argument that the officer accurately
identified the drugs, noting that "It]he object is as consistent in
225
feeling with a button or aspirin as it is with methamphetamine."
Other courts should be similarly cautious about accepting the claim
that the tactile information established probable cause. Unless the
prosecution presents additional evidence supporting the belief that
the felt object is contraband, the court should conclude that they
have failed to satisfy the immediately apparent requirement. In addition, the officer's claim that experience guided the interpretation
of the tactile data should not be taken on faith. 226 Instead, courts
should insist that the officer explain the objective basis on which he
or she concluded that the felt object was seizable.
Third, given the difficulty of assembling enough tactile information to establish the identity of the item, the court should rigorously enforce Terry's restriction on the invasion of privacy and
ensure that the officer did not overstep the authority for the initial
touching. In People v. Diaz,22 7 the court noted that additional probing for tactile information would be likely if plain feel could justify
a seizure. 228 When courts enforce the immediately apparent requirement, they may discover that the detailed information necessary to establish probable cause can rarely be accumulated within
the limited scope of the Terry or consent search on which the officer relied. For example, in State Iv. Hudson, the officer, who
reached into the defendant's pocket to determine whether an ob225. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
226. See State v. Robinson, No. 1996CA00009, 1996 WL 575978, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 9, 1996) (providing example of case in which courts accord too
much deference to officer's experience). In Robinson, the officer testified, "I've
done many searches and purchased crack cocaine numerous times and usually it's
found in a plastic baggie. It felt like it could be crack cocaine ....
I just determined that it was probably crack." Id. It appears that the court's finding of probable cause could only be based on the officer's claimed experience. The officer's
experience that crack cocaine is usually in plastic bags, however, does not address
the possibility that a given plastic bag will contain something else and does not
inform the court of any distinctive tactile characteristics that permitted the officer
to move from suspicion to probable cause.
227. 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993).
228. Id. at 302 (rejecting plain touch doctrine because it will lead to "pinching, squeezing or probing beyond the limited intrusion allowed under Teny").
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ject was a weapon and discovered a baggie of crack cocaine, testified that he "believed he was feeling a one ounce size piece of
cocaine broken off a kilo size." 229 The court, remanding for further
findings, remarked that "the detective described the substance in
the baggie with a particularity arguably unattainable without extensive manipulation." 230 Thus, when courts execute their duties conscientiously, the prosecution may discover that relying on plain feel
results in walking a fine line between unpermitted touching and
insufficient information.
229. State v. Hudson, 874 P.2d 160, 166 (Wash. 1994).
230. Id. After the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order, the Washington Supreme Court granted the state's request for review to determine whether a plain feel corollary to the plain view doctrine was consistent with

prior decisions. See id. at 161. Upon finding that the plain feel doctrine was not
precluded as a matter of law, the court remanded the case for a factual determination of whether the object was recognized by touch or through manipulation. See
id. at 167.
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